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With the development and proliferation of new social and connective 
technologies, crowdsourcing is becoming a viable method for conducting many types of 
work. At the same time, however, these developments are progressing more quickly than 
the law and raising new legal questions that often do not have definite answers yet. This 
thesis address some of these legal issues that crowdsourcing raises.  
In this thesis, we begin by addressing four areas that might lead to legal problems 
in the near future. First, we look at the labor and employment law issues that might arise 
from online crowdlabor markets like Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) and 
oDesk (www.odesk.com). Then we discuss inventorship issues under patent law that 
services like InnoCentive might experience. Next, we consider how data security laws 
could be problematic for open innovation projects like the Netflix challenge. Finally, we 
explore potential intellectual property ownership problems under copyright law.  
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After discussing these topics, this thesis then turns to examine in detail the area of 
crowdfunding. As the name suggests, crowdfunding refers to process of raising money 
through crowdsourcing. Until recently, one type of crowdfunding known as crowdfinance 
was largely illegal under federal securities laws. However, the law in this area is starting 
to change. In this chapter, we look at four different models for crowdfunding: donation, 
lending, reward/prepurchase, and equity investment. Following that, we consider how 
federal securities regulation might apply to crowdfunding, particularly the equity 
investment model. Finally we conduct a content analysis of three legislative proposals to 
create a limited exemption for crowdfunding in securities law that the U.S. Congress 
recently considered.  
Finally, we assess how crowdsourcing platforms use private contracts to bind 
their users to certain terms and conditions. This chapter begins with a primer on contract 
law. Then we examine the enforceability of standardized online agreements. Following 
that, we review several provisions that are common to nearly all crowdsourcing 
platforms. Finally, we conduct a content analysis of the specific Terms of Use contracts 
of several crowdsourcing platforms.  
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 In the summer of 1994, when the internet was only starting to become what it is 
today, Dave Ring hatched a plan to use this fledgling technology to do what was probably 
on the minds of many students at the time – beat FreeCell. As a graduate student at Texas 
A&M University, he enjoyed playing this card game that was included on his Windows 
operating system. But, he was troubled by the possibility that some of FreeCell’s 32,000 
possible hands might be unbeatable. Was he wasting his time trying to beat an impossible 
game? This thought bothered Ring, so he turned to the internet for help (Plante, 2012).  
 Instead of trying to solve all of the hands himself, Ring went to the Newsgroup 
sci.math to find volunteers. Through a series of posts, he rallied players around the globe 
to join together to try to beat FreeCell. Since each hand in the game was individually 
numbered, and the numbering was consistent across all games, Ring could distribute 
different hands to different players without unintentional overlap.  
So, he divided the hands into blocks and gave different blocks to anyone who 
wanted to join in. The players then reported whether they could beat the hands. Ring took 
any unbeaten hands, packaged them together, and redistributed them to other players. 
Eventually, Ring realized that no matter how hard they tried, no one could beat hand 
#11,982. Even with the combined knowledge, skill, and efforts of players across the 
world, no one could figure out this hand. FreeCell had won.   
 Though it happened over a decade before Jeff Howe (2006) coined the term, 
Ring’s project is an early example of what today we know as “crowdsourcing.” While 
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technology and crowdsourcing techniques have changed dramatically since 1994, Ring’s 
project shares the core of what makes crowdsourcing a unique and powerful method for 
problem solving. Through the connective and collaborative power of the internet, Ring 
was able to accomplish a task that otherwise would be impossible.  
Today, crowdsourcing operates very similarly to this example. It uses the modern 
communication technologies to find workers, distribute tasks, and solve any number of 
problems. Indeed, in just a short time, it has developed to become a viable option for 
businesses to accomplish many different tasks. For example, Netflix, recently sought help 
from the crowd to improve their movie recommendation algorithm; Google uses its 
reCaptcha tool to help train its text digitization system; and Kickstarter helps people ever 
day to raise money from the crowd to fun various projects.  
As more amazing examples like these develop, however, it becomes increasingly 
likely that crowdsourcing methods will run into legal problems. Currently, only a few 
laws directly address crowdsourcing. Nevertheless, as crowdsourcing continues to grow, 
we will see either old laws being used to deal with the issues that it raises, entirely new 
laws being drawn to regulate crowdsourcing activities directly, or both. Indeed, this is 
already happening, with the U.S. government recently passing a law that specifically 
affects one type of crowdsourcing. It is important to begin studying this intersection of 
crowdsourcing and the law so we can start to understand what the legal landscape is, and 
how it might develop.   
 In this thesis, we address several of the legal issues that crowdsourcing raises. In 
the first section, we provide a brief introduction to crowdsourcing then discus four areas 
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where crowdsourcing might run into legal regulation in the near future. Here, we begin 
by looking at labor and employment law and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). As 
the pool of crowdworkers grows, laws like the FLSA might be available to protect 
workers from unfair labor practices. We then turn to consider patent law. Though 
crowdsourcing might be an effective way to solve complex problems and develop 
patentable inventions, having many geographically and temporally dispersed people 
working together could cause problems with inventorship. After that, we look at 
problems that could arise with data security and the Federal Trade Commission’s 
protection of consumer private information. Finally, we consider intellectual property 
ownership issues under copyright law. A person who crowdsources the development of 
creative works could lose control over those works if he does not pay attention to 
copyright law. 
 Following this, we delve more deeply into one method of crowdsourcing that has 
recently received attention from the law: the process of raising money through 
crowdsourcing known as crowdfunding. In just the past few years, crowdsourcing has 
developed as a popular way to raise money for many kinds of projects. Currently, there 
does not seem to be a problem under the law with soliciting donations from the crowd. 
However, until recently, offering equity investment deals through crowdsourcing has 
been largely illegal. In this section, we begin by reviewing the different methods of 
crowdfunding. Then we discuss federal securities regulation and how equity investment 
deals could run into legal problems. Finally, we conduct a content analysis on several 
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legislative proposals that Congress considered to add an exemption to securities law to 
permit certain some equity investment using crowdfunding. 
 In the final section, we examine online agreements and how crowdsourcing 
platforms use them to bind their users to certain terms and conditions. Today private 
contracts regulate online behavior online more than enacted laws, agency rules, or 
judicial decisions. Indeed, even anecdotal evidence reveals the near-ubiquity of online 
contracts: anytime you click “I agree” or something similar online, you are potentially 
binding yourself to a terms of a use agreement. In this section, we begin with a brief 
primer on contract law and contract formation. We then look at the forms that these 
contacts often take and whether they are commonly enforceable. After that, we examine 
several common provisions to standardized online contracts. Finally, we take a closer 
look at a number of actual Terms of Use agreements from crowdsourcing platforms, 
comparing what terms they include, and how they use these agreements.  
BACKGROUND ON THE LEGAL ANALYSIS METHOD 
Before beginning our discussion of crowdsourcing and the law, it will be helpful 
to briefly review the basics of legal analysis. It is important to realize that there are many 
sources of law in the United States that create what we know as “the law.” First there is 
the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution establishes the structure, limits, and form of our 
government. After the Constitution, there are federal statutes that are passed by Congress 
and signed by the President. Third, Congress can pass statutes that create agencies, which 
can issue regulations. Following that, judicial decisions interpret statutes or apply 
common law rules and act as another source of law. Finally, each state has its own 
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constitution, legislatures, agencies, and court systems that can act in concert with or 
separate from their federal counterparts. 
 The second step to understanding legal analysis is to realize the difference 
between mandatory and persuasive authority. Because of the divided legal system in the 
U.S., Federal and state courts and laws have different jurisdictional reaches and not all 
laws or judicial decisions affect all people. Accordingly, some laws are binding whereas 
others are merely persuasive.  
Bintliff (2001) writes that the general rule for judicial decisions is a case will be 
binding on any court that is hierarchically lower than it. At the federal level, the court 
system is divided into 13 judicial circuits (uscourts.gov). Within each circuit, the lowest 
trial court level is District Court. For any circuit, there may be several district courts. For 
instance, the 2nd Circuit has courts in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. Decisions 
at the district court level are only binding on the court that made them, but are persuasive 
to other districts and potentially to the circuit court (Bintliff, 2001). The next level in the 
federal court system is called the Court of Appeals. Decisions from a Court of Appeals 
are binding on the district courts in that circuit, and persuasive to the sister circuits and 
any other courts in the country. Finally, the highest court in the federal system is the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is mandatory authority to any federal court, and, 
potentially, to any state court (depending on the issue). Like the federal system, each state 
has its own court system that operates analogously to the federal system, with the trial 
level courts at the bottom and a court of last resort at the top (often, but not always called 
the Supreme Court).  
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 Bintliff (2001) notes that the degree of persuasiveness varies depending on court 
and decision. For instance, federal Courts of Appeals decisions on federal law will 
normally be given great deference by state courts in the same circuit. Furthermore, cases 
with similar fact patterns will often be highly persuasive on subsequent cases. Bintliff 
writes that “factual similarity is key in choosing among persuasive decisions.”  
 As should be obvious, secondary sources like scholarly articles, treatises, 
Restatements of the Law, or legal casebooks are not actually law and are not mandatory 
authority on any legal body. Even so, Bintliff (2001) writes that decisions makers often 
accept guidance from sources outside of legal proscriptions. The Restatements of the 
Law, for instance, are generally considered to be authoritative statements of many 
different areas of the law. In particular, the Restatements of Torts and Contracts are 
extremely well respected (Harvard Law School Library, 2011).   
 Considering this discussion of sources of law and the relative weight of legal 
authority, part of the trick to legal analysis is to assess and combine the myriad materials, 
and then make a judgment of how they apply – or should apply – to a given situation. 
Edwards (2010) writes that people often mistakenly think that understanding the law is 
like playing a game. Games have clearly defined rules that precisely regulate what you 
can and cannot do; the, however, law does not. Instead, legal analysis requires a balance 
of numerous sources, interests, and potential consequences. So, lawyers seek for clues 
about the meaning of statues and how they might be applied from the language of many 
sources, evaluate the significance of them, and combine them to reach a conclusion.  
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 Edwards (2010) writes that lawyers most frequently use four basic types of 
reasoning. First, there is rules-based reasoning that reaches a decision by establishing and 
applying a law. Second, there is analogical/counter-analogical reasoning, which shows 
similarities and differences between old cases and a given situation. Third, there is policy 
based reasoning, which advocates for a result because it benefits society at large. Finally, 
there is narrative based reasoning which uses stories to suggest particular answers.  
 Considering these types of reasoning, and the different legal authorities, legal 
analysis strives to develop ideas for how laws might apply in given situations (Edwards, 
2010). Notably, Bintliff writes (2001) that analogizing from cases with similar fact 
patterns is a particularly powerful method for legal reasoning. Still, all these methods of 
reasoning are available and used. Accordingly, legal analysis consists of making the best 
argument for how the law might apply to a given situation while keeping in mind the 
different legal authorities and their relative degrees of persuasiveness.  
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Look Before You Leap: Legal Pitfalls of Crowdsourcing 
INTRODUCTION  
In 2006, Jeff Howe (2006) identified a trend: companies were shifting jobs that 
had formerly been assigned to an employee or a contracted worker, and instead 
distributing them to large groups of people. As James Surowiecki recognized in The 
Wisdom of the Crowds (2005), large groups can effectively and accurately solve some 
tasks better than individuals, and businesses were beginning to apply such thinking. 
Howe called this “crowdsourcing.” 
Even before Howe coined the term, crowdsourcing has been changing the way 
people think about conducting work. New platforms seem to develop daily, allowing 
businesses to connect with and distribute various tasks to multitudes of prospective 
workers. Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com), oDesk (www.odesk.com), 
Crowdspring (www.crowdspring.com), Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com), and many 
others all help people use the power of the crowd in various ways. As the crowdsourcing 
industry grows and diversifies, however, it seems increasingly likely that it will 
experience legal regulation. This paper discusses several areas of the law that will likely 
impact crowdsourcing in the future.  
We begin with employment law. Both federal and state laws stipulate how 
“employers” must treat “employees.” We especially discuss the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act, which guarantees anyone who qualifies as an “employee” things like a 
minimum wage and overtime regulation.  
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 Next, we consider inventorship issues under patent law. One way to use 
crowdsourcing is for the research and development of patentable inventions. However, 
joint inventorship issues naturally arise where multiple people work on an invention. 
Under the law, all inventors must be included on a patent application and if they are not, 
the patent might be rendered unenforceable. Thus, anyone who wants use the crowd for 
research and development must consider joint inventorship issues and act accordingly. 
Regarding innovation, more companies are now beginning to tap into “wisdom of 
crowds” based innovation by sharing more customer data in new ways, e.g. for academic 
research or with open-innovation providers like InnoCentive (www.innocentive.com). 
Unfortunately, developing effective methods for protecting customer privacy remains an 
open research problem (Narayanan and Shmatikov,  2008) with some highly visible 
recent failures (Barbaro & Zeller Jr., 2006; Ohm, 2010). The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has recently begun aggressively acting to protect consumers from such data 
breeches caused by commercial entities. Companies should be mindful of this.   
Finally, Crowdsourcing can also be an effective way to source and/or develop 
creative works. Yet because of copyright’s works made for hire and joint works 
doctrines, crowdsourcers can easily lose control over crowd-developed creative works if 
they do not pay attention to these doctrines. Thus, anyone interested in crowdsourcing 
creative design must carefully consider copyright laws. 
While we cannot hope to provide a complete survey of legal questions faced by 
crowdsourcing, we do introduce several legal issues and offer some insights into how 
lawyers and/or courts may (soon) think about the concerns that crowdsourcing raises. 
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Ultimately we offer three practical suggestions: be mindful of the law, define 
relationships in advance, and be open and honest with crowdworkers. 
BACKGROUND 
As Howe (2006) saw it, crowdsourcing takes the ideals of open sourcing and 
applies them outside of software development. However, crowdwork today includes 
many more labor models than Howe’s definition seems to imply. Bent Frei (2009) 
divides paid crowdwork into four categories, moving from the simplest to the most 
complex. At the simple-work end of the spectrum, there are Micro Tasks, which are 
small, easy, and tend to be distributed in high volume for very little compensation. These 
jobs are often as basic as image tagging. Next there are Macro Tasks, which also tend to 
be high volume and low pay, but require more skill and effort, like writing simple 
product reviews. In the first two categories, employers generally do not need to direct or 
communicate with their workers much if at all. Moving to more substantial work, Frei 
identifies Simple Projects, which are lower volume, higher pay, and require more skill 
and time commitment. These jobs are often tasks like basic website design or creating 
outlines for presentations. Finally, Complex Tasks are the most difficult form of 
crowdwork. These jobs require specialized skills and significant time commitments from 
the workers. Moreover, they are usually high paying, single project jobs, like designing 
software modules. These latter two categories typically require employers to 
communicate with and direct their workers more than with the simpler tasks. 
Crowdsourcing systems like Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) fall on the Micro 
Tasks end of this spectrum (Frei, 2009). Mturk is a bulletin board like website that allows 
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“Requesters” (employers) to post “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs) (jobs) which 
“Providers” (workers) can accept and accomplish. Generally, HITs require little time to  
complete and return very little pay – each can be as low as $0.01 (Felstiner, 2009). 
Indeed, Ross et al. (2010) found in a study of Mturk worker demographics that Providers 
earn an average of less than $2.00 per hour. Furthermore, Requesters tend to be relatively 
hands-off with their workers. Dow and Kelmmer (2011) write that Requesters and 
Providers are normally anonymous to each other; there is little direct interaction between 
them. Employers often treat workers as merely “interchangeable replacements for 
computational processes” (p. 1). Workers have been termed “human processing units” 
(HPUs), a new functional component of computer architecture to complement the central 
processing unit (CPU) (Davis et al., 2010). 
Moving to the more complex end of the spectrum of crowdwork, systems like 
oDesk allow employers to connect with highly skilled workers to complete much more 
substantial types of jobs. In a survey of oDesk workers, Brett Caraway (2010) found that 
oDesk more closely resembles a traditional work environment than the anonymous 
workforce on Mturk. First, oDesk allows employers to distribute work for hourly pay 
rather than as fixed price, single task contracts. Second, the platform encourages 
employers to communicate with, direct, and supervise their workers more. Through 
oDesk’s “Team Application” software, employers can monitor their workers’ keystrokes 
and mouse clicks, and even take screen shots and webcam pictures while they are 
working. Caraway (2010) writes that oDesk workers feel that they are held accountable 
for their work. Meanwhile, they earn substantially more money on oDesk than Providers 
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can on Mturk. oDesk reports that its workers commonly make between $10-$25 per hour 
on its platform (“oDesk”). 
Importantly, crowdwork is more than a niche labor market. Mturk, oDesk, and 
other types crowdwork represent a significant and growing amount of workers and 
money. In 2009, Mturk and oDesk had 200,000 and 331,000 registered users respectively 
(Frei, 2009). Further, from 1999-2009, workers across ten crowdsourcing companies 
earned a gross of $750,000,000 (Frei, 2009). Looking at Mturk specifically, Ipeirotis 
(2010) found that, from January 2009 through April 2010, 9436 requesters posted a total 
of 6,701,406 HITs, for a total value of at least $529,259. Since this study did not capture 
redundant HITs and may have missed many short-lived HITs, the actual sum of money 
which changed hands could be far greater. oDesk reports that employers spent more than 
$15,000,000 on online work in April 2011 and over 2000 people join its workforce daily 
(“oDesk”). 
With advantages for both, the crowdwork market might be attractive to workers 
and employers alike. For employers, crowdwork offers a highly scalable workforce of on-
demand labor that they can easily tap into with little transaction costs. Meanwhile, 
workers can profit from their “spare cycles”, or, in the case of platforms like oDesk, use 
their specialized skills (Felstiner, 2010). Moreover, with unemployment at 9% (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2011), and very high underemployment (Newport and Muller, 2011), it 
is likely that more people will consider crowdwork in the future when looking for 
supplementary or primary incomes. As the crowdlabor market grows in profile and 
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importance, however, it seems increasingly possible that we should expect legal 
regulation.  
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
One area where crowdsourcing could clearly intersect with the law is in Labor 
and Employment law. With a substantial labor market, and numerous platforms enabling 
various types of work, the crowdsourcing industry could face federal and/or state 
regulation over employment practices in the near future. While crowdlabor has many 
benefits, anyone considering it must be aware of the potential consequences of having 
crowdworkers as “employees.” 
In the United States, both state and federal laws put restrictions on employers to 
protect against harm to employees. Since a complete survey of employment and labor law 
is outside of the scope of this paper, we focus on the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA). Not only is this law very important itself, but it will also help elucidate how 
other similar regulations may work. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act 
In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act in response to declining 
wages caused by the Great Depression. “Low wages perpetuated a downward economic 
spiral,” and the federal government decided to step in rather than let the market fix its 
own problems (Cherry, 2009). So, with the FLSA it established things like the federal 
minimum wage (currently $7.25 per hour), overtime protection, and special rules for 
children workers. 
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Before the FLSA can apply, however, the parties in a potential employment 
situations must be “employers” and “employees” within the meaning of the statute. 
Generally, employers fall under the FLSA if they conduct interstate business, or generate 
more than $500,000 in yearly gross revenue (United States Department of Labor, 2009).  
Unfortunately, the act is unclear about who qualifies as an "employee." Struggling 
with this uncertainty, courts have developed several tests to determine whether someone 
is an employee under the FLSA. For example, the Common Law test looks at how much 
control the employer has over the worker’s work. Meanwhile, the Economic Reality Test 
focuses on the economic relationship between the worker and the employer and the 
degree of financial dependency between them (Smith, Hodges, Stabile, & Gely, 2009). 
Courts applying the FLSA most commonly consider seven factors to determine 
employment status (Felstiner, 2010). No single factor is determinative, but all must be 
weighed: 
How integral the work is to the employer’s business; 
The duration of relationship between worker and employer; 
If the worker had to invest in equipment or material himself to do the 
work; 
How much control the employer has over the worker; 
The worker’s opportunity for profit and loss; 
How much skill and competition there is in the market for this type of 
work; 
If the worker is an independent business organization. 
Importantly, FLSA employment status depends on the actual relationship between the 
employer and employee, not their subjective opinions of their relationship. Felstiner 
(2010) writes that even though both Mturk and oDesk classify their workers as 
independent contractors, this does not determine their status. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
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held that workers may be employees under the FLSA even if both the employer and 
employee agree that they are independent contractors (Felstiner, 2010). Moreover, Cherry 
(2009) notes that courts are more likely to find someone is an employee where employers 
are able to exert greater control over workers and can direct their work. Conversely, 
courts often classify workers as non-employees where they use their own equipment, set 
their own schedules, and are paid per project instead of hourly or via salary. 
Applying the FLSA to crowdwork, Felstiner (2010) and Cherry (2009) argue 
Mturk workers could possibly be “employees” under the FLSA. For example, Felstiner 
(2010) writes that Providers who repeatedly conduct HITs for the same Requesters may 
be more like FLSA employees, even though they can complete individual HITs quickly. 
Still, it seems unlikely that a court would classify them as such. Requesters cannot exert 
much control over Providers, Providers use their own equipment, their employment is 
ordinarily for a very short time, and they are paid per-job. Even if some factors weigh 
toward Providers being employees, the others strongly weigh against them being 
classified as such under the FLSA. 
Of course, this analysis may be different across the various types of crowdwork. 
oDesk is a prime example because its workers seem closer to “employees” under the 
FLSA than Mturk’s Providers. First, employers on oDesk have more power and 
opportunity to control their workers. The “Team Application” software allows employers 
to monitor their workers in ways that are impossible even in conventional workplaces. 
Caraway (2010) writes that one survey respondent said that this software is like “being in 
an office environment where you have a boss or coworkers looking over your shoulder” 
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(p. 117). Second, many oDesk workers are paid hourly, like traditional employees. 
Indeed, oDesk encourages this. Finally, oDesk proclaims that workers can build 
reputations so employers can choose whom they know and like to work with (“oDesk”). 
Accordingly, employment relationships may exist longer than single projects. 
Ultimately it is not clear if any crowdworker would be classified as an employee 
under the FLSA. This uncertainty, however, means that potential employers must be 
aware of the possibility of regulation. Indeed, as crowdlabor grows, this seems to become 
more likely.  
PATENT LAW 
Another area where crowdsourcing may intersect with legal regulation is in Patent 
Law. As crowdsourcing methods become more sophisticated, and more skilled labor 
enters the workforce, the number of complex projects that use crowdlabor for some or all 
of their production is likely to grow. One area that will probably experience this is the 
research and development of patentable inventions. However, having multiple people 
working on an invention raises important questions of joint inventorship. Anyone 
considering using the crowd’s inventiveness and specialized skills to develop patentable 
design ought to consider such issues which could jeopardize their patents. 
As previously discussed, crowdwork can help effectively solve complex 
problems. Schenk and Guittard (2009) profile InnoCentive as an example. 
Pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly created InnoCentive in 2001 as a way to help develop 
novel solutions to various problems. Today, over 225,000 of “the world’s brightest 
problem solvers” are part of this community that works on problems across many 
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disciplines, from Business to Engineering to Computer Science. The purchase cost for 
one of these solutions can range from $10,000 to $1,000,000 (“InnoCentive”). Like 
Mturk and oDesk, problem seekers and solvers alike have many incentives for using 
platforms like InnoCentive. However, with multiple workers helping to develop useful 
items, these systems implicate problems with inventorship.  
U.S. Patent law grants creators of new, non-obvious, useful inventions limited 
duration monopolies over the exploitation of their works. Patents last maximally 20 years 
and give inventors the negative right to prevent others from practicing their inventions 
(Mueller, 2006). In exchange, inventors must disclose certain information about their 
inventions by disclosing it on the application, including the design, the purpose, and all 
the inventors contributing to the inception of the invention (Seymore, 2006). 
Joint Inventorship 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2011), multiple people making an invention must apply 
for the patent together. Interestingly for crowdsourcing, the law specifically holds that 
people can be joint inventors even if they work at different times, in different places, or 
contribute to different degrees. Moreover, a patent could be rendered unenforceable if an 
inventor is not on the application (Seymore, 2006). 
As Seymore (2006) writes, determining inventorship is especially difficult where 
multiple parties work on different parts of the same project. Writing about academic 
research settings similar to crowdsourcing, he notes that inventions may derive from 
many institutions, research groups, outside contractors, and graduate students all working 
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together, but not necessarily aware of each other. Figuring out who deserves inventor 
status, who does not, and even who worked on an invention can be difficult. 
Of course, not everyone who works on an invention must be on the application. 
An “inventor” must contribute to the conception of the invention; merely working under 
the direction of an inventor is insufficient. Conception is the “touchstone of inventorship” 
(Burroughs Wellcome Co v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 1994, p. 1227). Each inventor “must 
contribute in some significant manner to the conception” (BJ Services Company v. 
Halliburton Energy Services Inc., 2003, p. 1373). Accordingly, an inventor must add to 
the invention’s core ideas. 
Unfortunately, the line between co-inventor and worker is often unclear. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit wrote in Burroughs Wellcome Co. (1994), 
“inventorship cases tend to be highly fact-specific and seldom provide firm guidance on 
resolving future disputes” (p. 1227). Still, one can make several observations about 
potential crowdsourced inventions. If, for example, a crowdsourcer offers a reward for a 
solution to a problem without further direction, similar to InnoCentive, the person/team 
that answers that problem successfully would likely be inventors. Conversely, if a 
crowdsourcer directs the crowd to perform research tasks that help develop the concept 
for a patentable design, the workers likely would not be inventors. Finally, if multiple 
teams work to solve multiple problems that are then combined as claims on one patent, 
everyone who contributes to the conception of a claim would be an inventor who must be 
included on the application (Seymore, 2004; Sibley, 2008). 
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Crowdsourcing may be an attractive and effective way for companies to develop 
novel solutions to any number of problems. Crowdsourcers, however, must be aware of 
patent law before conducting such work or they risk losing control over their intellectual 
property.  
DATA SECURITY 
A third area where crowdsourcing and the law will likely intersect is in data 
security. Businesses today are increasingly sharing information about themselves with the 
crowd in order to strengthen research and development. Realizing crowdsourcing’s 
potential for innovation, these companies may be tempted to disclose data about their 
customers/users to researchers to facilitate and stimulate these efforts and help drive the 
crowd’s ingenuity. Indeed, both America Online (AOL) and Netflix attempted to do so 
(Barbaro & Zeller Jr., 2006; Ohm, 2010). However, as both found out, doing so risks 
violating data security regulations.  
The FTC is the federal agency charged with protecting consumers from adverse 
acts committed by commercial entities. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2011) gives the FTC power to 
prevent businesses from engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” that affect 
commerce. Recently, this agency has been aggressively protecting consumers from data 
breaches by commercial entities, even scrutinizing the release of supposedly 
“anonymous” data. While crowdsourcing offers new opportunities for better analyzing 
and processing user data, businesses considering engaging in such crowdsourcing should 
tread carefully and stay informed to minimize risk of FTC data security regulations.   
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Even though this authority may not initially seem to include data security, since 
the 1990s the FTC has extended its power to scrutinize commercial entities that put their 
users’ privacy at risk. Michael Scott (2008) details this development. The FTC first acted 
to protect online privacy was in 1999. In that case, the web hosting service Geocities 
disclosed its users’ personal data to third parties who then turned and used that 
information for purposes that the users had not agreed to. The FTC found that Geocities 
acted improperly and needed to inform its users about data it collected, for what purpose, 
and to whom it would be disclosed. 
Since the Geocities case, the FTC has further developed its power over data 
security. First, in 2005, the agency found that BJ’s Wholesale Club violated the “unfair or 
deceptive practices” standard by failing to adequately protect its customer records from 
thieves. Shortly thereafter, the FTC filed a similar complaint against DSW when hackers 
broke into the company’s database. The agency found that DSW failed to protect its 
customer’s private data and thus violated the deceptive acts prohibition. Then, in 2006, 
the FTC extended its reach even further in a complaint against CardSystems Solutions 
(CSS). CSS provided businesses with products that authorized credit card transactions. 
The FTC found that CSS violated privacy regulations by failing to protect the personal 
information it collected by storing data in an unsecure format, failing to assess the 
vulnerability of its system, and not implementing strong protections against hackers 
(Scott, 2008). 
What is more, the FTC also regulates how businesses treat supposedly anonymous 
user data. Recently, some companies have found that they can source innovative business 
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ideas by sharing user information to the crowd. In 2006 AOL released data from 650,000 
users and 20 million search queries to the information retrieval community for research. 
Before doing so, the company attempted to anonymize the data. A New York Times 
article, however, showed that one could still find the identities of individual users 
(Barbaro & Zeller Jr., 2006). In response, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed 
a complaint with the FTC, requesting that it act against AOL (EFF, 2006). AOL 
ultimately fired the individual responsible and effectively shut down its research division 
(Ohm, 2010).  
Later that year, Netflix released one hundred million anonymized user records as 
part of its “Netflix Prize” Contest. In this, the company offered one million dollars to the 
first team to significantly improve Netflix’s recommendation algorithm. This contest was 
so successful the company decided to hold another one. However, two researchers 
discovered it was “surprisingly easy” for a malicious party to use Netflix’s data, 
combined with a little other information, to find the identities of the users in the dataset 
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008). Soon thereafter, a class action suit was filed against 
the company and the FTC entered the picture. Fearing legal troubles and agency pressure, 
Netflix cancelled its second contest (Ohm, 2010). 
Maureen Ohlhausen (2011) writes that the FTC’s views on data security have 
evolved from a “notice and choice” approach, where an online business would remain 
safe by adhering to its stated privacy promises, through a harms-based model, to today’s 
hybrid approach. In 2010, the agency proposed a new framework for protecting consumer 
privacy, broadening its scope even further. Now it applies to all commercial entities that 
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collect information from consumers, online or offline, whether they interact directly or 
indirectly with consumers (Ohlhausen, 2011). This includes “any data that can reasonably 
be linked to a specific consumer, computer, or other device” (Ohlhausen, 2011, p. 44). 
Instead of focusing on privacy promises, this model looks at company actions likely to 
cause physical or economic harm or intrude into the lives of their customers.  
With such actions, the FTC has shown it is moving toward a broad approach on 
consumer data security. This may impact the crowdsourcing industry in at least two 
ways. First, online businesses that collect user data must both protect them and only use 
them in ways that their users consent to. Second, as the AOL and Netflix examples show, 
while there may be benefits to using crowdsourcing to analyze user data, such disclosure 
can create new data security problems, even if an honest attempt is made to anonymize 
customer records. Businesses interested in using the crowd in this manner should 
understand the FTC’s stance on data security and weigh their actions carefully.  
COPYRIGHT 
Another legal area at issue is intellectual property ownership under copyright. 
Anyone considering crowdsourcing creative works should be aware of copyright 
implications bearing on control over rights to those works. 
Crowdwork can support creative designs in several ways. Consider Crowdspring, 
whose platform provides a place where users searching for creative designs can connect 
with a crowd of artists who are looking to sell their works (Schenk and Guittard, 2010). 
In particular, Crowdspring advertises itself as a place where businesses can source things 
like company logos. Users can go on the site, provide general ideas for a design, and 
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request proposals from the crowd. Artists then take the instructions, work out their ideas, 
and offer back potential designs from which the users can purchase their favorite 
(“Crowdspring”). 
Another example of crowdsourcing creative work is The Johnny Cash Project. 
Created by Chris Milk, The Johnny Cash Project is a collaborative art project that brings 
together contributions from many artists into a single work (Ehrlich, 2010). Anyone can 
register on the site and contribute a drawing to the project. These drawing are then 
combined to make a music video. Each person's work is part of the final artistic creation 
(“Johnny Cash Project”). 
These platforms raise two separate questions about copyright ownership. While 
Crowdspring implicates copyright’s doctrine on works made for hire, the Johnny Cash 
Project raises issues about joint works/authorship. Fortunately for their users, both 
systems address these questions for them in their terms of use agreements. However, a 
crowdsourcer who decides to act outside of these platforms might not realize the 
copyright issues involved and could easily lose control over the work that the crowd 
produces. 
Copyright Basics 
Similar to Patent law, Copyright law gives authors certain rights to protect their 
works from improper use. Instead of pertaining to useful inventions, however, copyright 
protects original creative works (17 U.S.C. § 102, 2011). Once a work is copyrighted, its 
author receives various rights, including the ability to stop unauthorized copying, 
distribution, and/or public display (17 U.S.C. § 106, 2011). 
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Obtaining a copyright today is quite easy. Works automatically receive copyrights 
if they are original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Authors must only 
contribute “a modicum of creativity” to a work for it to be to be original (Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991). A work is fixed when it is 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for more than a transitory duration” (17 U.S.C. § 101, 2011). After 
creating the work, the author does not need to do anything else; a copyright is valid 
without registration. 
Works Made For Hire 
Typically creators own the copyrights to their works. They create their works, 
capture them in a tangible medium of expression, and the copyrights vests in the creators 
immediately thereafter (17 U.S.C. § 201, 2011). This changes, however, when a work is a 
“work made for hire.” Under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011), works made for hire occur in two 
situations. First, works made by employees within the scope of their employment are 
works made for hire. Second, certain specially commissioned works can be works made 
for hire if the parties agree to such in writing. 
While a crowdsourced creative work could fit in the second category, systems like 
Crowdspring more immediately implicate the first: works made by employees. Once 
again, the issue turns on who is an employee. Stated simply: employees make works 
made for hire and their employers own those copyrights; non-employees do not make 
works made for hire and they own their own copyrights. Accordingly, a court must first 
determine if a person is an employee or not to understand copyright ownership. 
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Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance on who is an 
employee under Copyright law. In Committee for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989), 
Committee for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) hired Reid to design and build a 
sculpture. After hiring him, CCNV left him to work with only minimal interference. He 
submitted a few proposals that the CCNV considered and rejected, but he operated 
mostly on his own. Once Reid was finished, CCNV paid and took possession of the 
sculpture. Soon, however, they began to argue over how CCNV could use the sculpture. 
Reid asserted copyright over it, claiming that he owned the intellectual property as its 
creator and could control its use. CCNV, however, felt that it owned the intellectual 
property because Reid was its employee. 
The Court rejected CCNV’s claim and sided with Reid. It instructed lower courts 
to look at twelve factors when considering employment status under Copyright (CCNV v. 
Reid, pp. 751-752). While similar, these are distinct from the seven factors used by FLSA 
to determine employment status. The twelve factors are: 
The hiring party’s right to control how the product is accomplished; 
Who owns the tools that the worker uses; 
Where the work is done; 
The duration of their relationship; 
If the hiring person can give the worker more work; 
If the worker can self-decide when and how to work; 
The method of payment; 
If the worker can hire assistants without employer;  
Whether the employer is a business; 
If there are employee benefits; 
If the work is in regular business of the hiring party; 
Tax treatment of the worker. 
A detailed analysis of these factors and their treatment in subsequent cases is 
outside of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, a few observations are useful. To 
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paraphrase the Court in Reid (1989), the question is whether a relationship resembles a 
conventional employer-employee relationship. Nearly every time courts have held 
workers to be en employees under this clause, the hiring party has participated directly in 
creating the work (Nimmer, 2011, § 5.03). Essentially, if something looks more like a 
regular work situation, with a hands-on employer actively directing the worker and 
involved in the work, then the worker will be an employee and his work will belong to 
the employer. If, as in Reid, an employer mostly leaves a worker alone to complete a 
single task while using his own tools, he will probably not be considered an employee 
and he will own the work himself. Moreover, while highly skilled workers are not 
insulated from being employees, the task here is to weigh the factors against each other to 
determine the nature of the relationship between the hiring and working party. 
If a worker is an employee under the copyright statute, the inquiry turns to the 
scope of employment. An employee who conducts work outside his scope of employment 
does not create a work made for hire. Courts addressing this prong usually consider three 
factors: 1. Is it the kind of work the employee was hired to perform; 2. Did it occur 
during authorized work hours; 3. Was it done, at least in part, to serve the employer 
(Nimmer, 2011). 
Applying all these factors to a platform like Crowdspring, a crowdworker would 
likely not be considered an employee and would retrain copyright. Like Reid, 
crowddesigners work mostly independent of the employers, using their own equipment, 
for limited times, in their own spaces, and are paid by the project instead of hourly. 
Indeed, they may be even more independent than Reid himself was. Even though it seems 
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likely that a contracted design would probably be within the worker’s scope of 
employment, these designers would probably own the copyrights to their works absent a 
written agreement changing the relationship, because they would likely not be employees 
under copyright.  
So, a small business that crowdsourced its company logo design but did not 
receive the copyright to the design from the creator would not have the right to 
reproduce, distribute, or publicly display copies of that logo. Crowdspring solves this 
problem for its users by providing a readymade contract for them. However, no one needs 
Crowdspring to crowdsource creative designs, and there may be reasons to forgo this 
platform. Indeed, such work could even be done on Mturk or without any specific 
platform. Yet, such crowdsourcers must account for the works made for hire doctrine or 
they could lose control over their designs.  
Joint Works 
Turning to the Johnny Cash Project example, another way that Copyright law can 
affect crowdsourcing is with the joint works doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) defines a 
joint work as a work that is created by two or more people who intend their contributions 
to be merged into inseparable parts of a whole. To be a joint author, each person must 
contribute independently copyrightable parts to the finished product (Gaiman v. 
McFarlane, 2004). As mentioned, it is easy for something to be copyrightable. So, a 
putative joint author must only contribute something that is original and not in the public 
domain, and both authors must intend to end up with a copyrightable final product. 
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The joint works doctrine is significant for crowdsourced creative works because 
each author owns them in common. Consequently, all authors to a work have equal rights 
to control, sell, and profit from it if it is sold, or can sue to recover their share (Davis v. 
Blige, 2007). A collaborative project like the Johnny Cash Project clearly implicates joint 
works issues. Its explicit purpose is to join artists' works together into a single art project. 
So, there seems to be an expectation that the users are creating a copyrightable work 
together by contributing parts which will be combined into an inseparable whole. If those 
pieces are copyrightable, then each artist could be a joint author and each would have 
ownership rights over the work.  
Once again, like Crowdspring, the Johnny Cash Project addresses copyright 
ownership issues for its users. However, the danger for future crowdsourcers comes from 
how easy it is to use crowdsourcing to develop joint creative projects without using an 
extant platform or model. The Sheep Market (www.thesheepmarket.com), for example, 
created an online mosaic of hand drawn sheep by sourcing drawings from Mturk. 
Moreover, Kittur, Smus, and Kraut (2011) have proposed new mechanisms to 
automatically divide and combine complex tasks like article writing to be crowdsourced 
better. Indeed, the internet allows almost anyone to tap into the crowd’s creativity. Thus, 
anyone considering crowdsourcing a collaborative project must consider Copyright law 
before moving ahead or they could potentially lose sole control over their works. 
WHAT YOU CAN DO 
The various scenarios we have discussed beg the question, what should someone 
who is considering crowdsourcing do? In short, do not panic! While lawyers may seem 
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often to preach doom and gloom about possible legal consequences, our intent is to 
empower readers with basic information to better consider their actions and possible 
effects of them. We suggest at least three lessons below. 
Be Mindful of the Law 
The first lesson might seem obvious: be mindful of the law. With new 
opportunities and technologies, one may naturally be tempted to rush in without worry, 
especially in virgin territories where no regulation is immediately apparent. For better 
and worse, however, the diverse scenarios we have considered show that legal regulation 
is everywhere. From employment to privacy, the law touches various dimensions of 
crowdsourcing. Furthermore, it is constantly evolving. While this may be obvious from 
the rapid development of securities regulations the FTC’s approach to data security, it is 
also true throughout the law.  
Legal challenges frequently fit old laws into new situations. As Felstiner (2009) 
argues, the FLSA, a statute from 1938, could apply to a method of business that was 
almost inconceivable when Congress created it. Moreover, it is possible that federal and 
state legislatures and agencies will create new laws and administrative rules to protect the 
growing crowd-workforce. Anyone interested in crowdsourcing should therefore consider 
the potential legal ramifications, weigh the costs and benefits, and proceed accordingly. 
Use Contracts to Clearly Define Your Relationships 
Our second lesson is to clearly define the relationship between employer and 
worker by contract before beginning any work. Patent law, for example, allows inventors 
to transfer their rights in a patent using written contracts (35 U.S.C. § 261, 2011). 
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Seymore (2006) writes that schools frequently require professors and graduate students to 
sign contracts before they are hired that assign away their rights in their inventions. 
Furthermore, some courts have found that researchers have a duty to assign their work to 
their employers in some situations. Even though the workers may be inventors in both 
instances, they are not owners and cannot control the invention. Similarly, Copyright 
owners can transfer or license some or all of their rights to their works with written 
documents (17 U.S.C. § 201, 2011). So, employers can have a copyright transferred to 
them, even if it initially belongs to their worker. Finally, crowdfunders can clearly state 
when a transaction represents a donation rather than an investment, with no expectation 
of profits offered. This avoids any confusion up front. 
Online entities commonly use “clickwrap” or “browserwrap” agreements to 
define their relationships with their users. Anytime users click “I agree” or something 
similar to a list of terms before accessing a site, they bind themselves to the requirements 
therein. Clickwrap agreements are very popular, and most courts have held them to be 
valid contracts unless their terms are unconscionable (Davis, 2007). Indeed, all of the 
crowdsourcing systems discussed above require their users to accept such agreements 
before using the services. Of course, some things cannot be contracted away, like 
employment status under the FLSA or inventorship status. Some crowdsourcing 
agreements we have seen may not stand up in court. Still such contracts can help resolve 
many problems in advance and help to clarify the relationship boundaries between 
crowdsourcer and crowdworker. 
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Be Open and Honest 
Our final suggestion is that crowdsourcers should always be open and honest 
about their expectations, work offered, and how they will treat the data they collect. As 
mentioned, the FTC has become increasingly aggressive in protecting data security. 
Accordingly, any crowdsourcing enterprise that collects and/or distributes user data must 
protect those data, as well as inform its users of what information it collects and how it 
will use that information. 
More broadly, having clear expectations and policies might help crowdsourcers 
avoid legal conflicts in general. Consider Reid (1989) again. Reid and CCNV’s legal 
dispute stemmed, in part, from their differing expectations. CCNV thought it rightfully 
owned the statue and could use it anyway it wanted. As the artist, however, Reid saw his 
creation differently. He would not allow CCNV to use it in ways that he did not intend. If 
the two parties had discussed these issues earlier, they may have been able to avoid 
litigation. Admittedly, communication cannot prevent all legal problems and it is 
impossible to predict every situation that may arise. Nevertheless, by being open, honest, 
and clearly stating their expectations, crowdsourcers can hopefully avoid legal troubles, 
and crowdworkers can understand their roles without false expectations.  
CONCLUSION 
As the crowdsourcing industry grows increasingly popular, it may face a variety 
of potential legal challenges. This paper introduces just four areas where legal regulation 
and crowdsourcing may intersect. First, under employment/labor laws, crowdsourcers 
may risk having crowdworkers deemed employees, potentially raising the costs of 
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conducting crowdwork. Second, though crowdwork can help design patentable 
inventions, crowdsourcers must pay attention to the rules of inventorship or their patent 
could be unenforceable. Third, while the crowdsourcing may be a great way of analyzing 
supposedly anonymous user data, business may run into data security regulations as both 
AOL and Netflix did. Finally, because of Copyright’s ownership doctrines, 
crowdsourcers may lose solitary control over creative works unless they address the 
issues of works made for hire and joint works.  
Further issues will undoubtedly arise as crowdsourcing develops, moves into new 
areas, and impacts a greater number of people. Future work in this area may look to the 
open source industry for guidance. This similar, but distinct industry has already 
weathered some legal challenges which may be instructive for crowdsourcers. For now, 




Crowdfunding: The Future of Fundraising and Startup Capital 
INTRODUCTION 
With the development of greater online connectivity and better social interaction 
technologies, crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006) has risen as a viable method of leveraging the 
growing pool of online labor, intelligence, and creativity of the internet crowd. Examples 
like Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com), oDesk (www.odesk.com), 
InnoCentive (www.innocentive.com), Threadless (www.threadless.com), and Star Wars: 
Uncut (www.starwarsuncut.com) show how powerful crowdsourcing can be to 
accomplish a wide variety of tasks. Each have successfully brought together the crowd in 
new and fascinating ways to complete work that previously would have been done by an 
individual or business.   
In this chapter, we study this intersection of technology, practice, and policy in 
the context of a particular crowdsourcing model: crowdfunding. While people have 
solicited donations forever, crowdsourcing uses developments in connective technologies 
to change how fundraising in significant ways. Whereas traditional fundraising models 
tend to collect larger amounts from fewer individuals, crowdfunding exploits the breadth 
and diversity of the Internet to solicit typically smaller contributions from a large number 
of people. This can be a powerful method of fundraising for any number of users. 
Already we have seen platforms effectively use microloans systems to raise money and 
interest in their charitable causes; political campaigns have raised astounding amounts of 
money by appealing to the crowd; artists, musicians, and game developers can use 
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crowdfunding to help fund their products; and small businesses can raise startup capital 
by appealing to the crowd on the internet and asking for support.  
While crowdfunding arises in multiple forms, our interest lies in analyzing the 
emergence and legal evolution of crowdfinance, in which equity investment is offered to 
the crowd in exchange for funding (Bradford, 2011). While many types of crowdfunding 
have already made a significant societal impact, current federal securities legislation has 
largely prohibited crowdfinance. Under the Securities Act of 1933, anyone who offers a 
security to the general public must register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, a time consuming and onerous task that might not be available to most 
crowdfunders. Moreover, while there are some exceptions for small, private securities 
offerings, they prohibit using an open call to raise money, and thus conflict with 
crowdfunding.  
Perceived shortcomings of existing policy in comparison to the potential benefits 
of crowdfinance has recently sparked renewed legal scrutiny of this policy, as well as the 
proposal of several alternative legal paths by which we might create laws that are more 
permissive of crowdfinance. As such, we believe that now is an apt time for us to review 
crowdfunding and crowdfinance, assess alternative legal visions for a future which 
includes crowdfinance, and consider future implications of new policy as technology, 
practice, and policy continue to evolve and collide.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, it looks at what 
crowdfunding, is what are the different types of crowdfunding. It then considers how 
federal securities laws apply to crowdfunding, particularly crowdfinance. Next, this 
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chapter looks at whether several exemptions to securities laws could be useful in 
crowdfinance situations. Finally, it discusses the new crowdfunding legislation that 
Congress is currently considering. 
WHAT IS CROWDFUNDING? 
Jeff Howe (2006) defines crowdsourcing as the act of taking something that was 
once done by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined network of people via the 
internet in an open call for help. Crowdfunding takes these ideas from crowdsourcing and 
applies them to fundraising. Whereas crowdsourcing solicits people’s spare seconds to 
complete small tasks, crowdfunding collects their spare change (Howe, 2009). In 
comparison to traditional, narrowly targeted fund raising campaigns, crowdfunding 
campaigns tend to seek as many contributors as possible, benefiting from the power of 
the Internet to reach wider, more diverse audiences. Crowdfunding also tends to solicit 
smaller, micro-contributions, which while individually small, in aggregate can amount to 
a significant source of revenue. Heminway and Hoffman (2011) describe crowdfunding 
as any internet-based business enterprise that seeks relatively small donations using a 
website to connect projects to potential funders. Their restriction to “business enterprises” 
is too strict, however, since many charitable organizations, or even individuals, are 
capitalizing on crowdfunding today. In fact, such small organizations or isolated 
individuals particularly benefit from crowdfunding, because it requires little more than an 
Internet-connection to solicit and begin collecting contributions. Belleflame, Lambert, 
and Schweinbacher (2010) emphasize the importance of the open call as a key ingredient 
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to notifying and enabling the crowd of potential supporters to participate in 
crowdfunding.  
At the heart of crowdfunding is a financial transaction executed between two 
parties: the fundraiser and a financial supporter who contributes. As in traditional 
banking, a 3
rd
 party often facilitates or mediates the transaction in practice. Ordanini, 
Miceli, Pizzetti, and Parasuraman (2011) emphasize the role of this 3
rd
 party in 
crowdfunding: the Internet platform which enables fundraisers to solicit support from the 
crowd of potential contributors. However, the relationship between fundraisers and 
supporters is often far more than purely financial. For example, crowdfunding can 
connect producers and consumers in new ways which might be more difficult to achieve 
via traditional funding models. Burkett (2011) notes that financial supporters usually feel 
some affinity for the projects they choose to fund. Ordanini et al. (2011) suggest that 
crowdfunding provides an avenue through which consumers can be part of the selection, 
development, and production of new products. In addition to monetary support, 
contributors may also help to develop the projects themselves. Belleflame et al. (2010) 
similarly argue that crowdfunding can give fundraisers insight into their 
customers/audiences. It creates new channels for information and interaction between 
organizations and their customers that can be used for promotions, to support user-based 
innovation, or to learn about customer-interests while raising money. 
In addition to enabling fundraisers to build new types of relationships with their 
patrons, crowdfunding is also enabling these relationships to form across larger 
geographic distances. Thanks to the Internet, crowdfunding enables organizations to 
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reach a more widely geographically dispersed population of potential supporters. 
Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2011) write that investments for most crowdfunding 
ventures tend not to be purely local, unlike most small, early-stage business ventures. 
With traditional funding, the average distance between a venture capitalist and its target 
firm is about 70 miles. With crowdfunding, in contrast, they find that the average 
distance between investors and their investments in crowdfunding is larger 3100 miles.   
As with other forms of crowdsourcing, both extrinsic and intrinsic forms of 
motivation are often at work in crowdfunding, impacting both fundraisers and their 
supporters. Gerber, Hui, and Kuo (2012) found that in addition to raising money and 
establishing relationships with their patrons, fundraisers also often seek to receive 
validation of their abilities, replicate the success of others, and to expand the awareness 
of their work through social media. Similarly, patrons may not simply seek rewards for 
their financial support, but may further look to help creators and the causes they believe 
in. In creative enterprises, patrons might wish to participate in the creative process 
alongside the fundraisers.  
An increasingly diverse set of organizations and industries are now beginning to 
use crowdfunding. As an example of a charitable organization, consider GlobalGiving 
(www.globalgiving.org), which allows anyone to contribute online to development 
projects around the world. Since 2002, over 5,000 projects have received nearly $60 
Million, from about 250,000 Global Giving users. In addition to supporting charitable 
causes, crowdfunding is also now “competing” with traditional micro-loan providers. 
Kiva (www.kiva.org), for example, was founded in 2005 to enable people to more easily 
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find and loan money to charitable causes of their choosing (Howe, 2008). These loans are 
extremely low risk, with 98.88% being repaid. In terms of industry, Aitamarto (2011) and 
Betancourt (2009) discuss crowdfunding as a method for raising revenue in journalism. 
As traditional business models in this field are losing economic viability, crowdfunding 
might provide a way to raise money while learning from the collective intelligence of the 
crowd at the same time. Aitamarto (2011) focuses on Spot.Us, an online platform that 
allows freelance journalists to pitch story ideas, and users fund the stories that they would 
like to be reported. Beyond just giving money, users can also comment on developing 
stories or pitch ideas, and even submit new information, sources, or ideas that might help 
the final product. Traditional editors still perform a function on Spot.Us, but the crowd is 
more directly connected with the creation of stories than in the past. Similarly, Kappel 
(2009) argues that crowdfunding might also provide a new source of revenue in the 
recording industry. He writes that ex ante crowdfunding can be effective in this industry 
by using “patronage perks” like special mentions in liner notes, autographed albums, or 
backstage passes to encourage support. Kappel notes that several Europeans companies 
have experimented with this type of funding, but there are barriers to entry in the U.S. 
market – like federal securities regulation – that might be problematic. 
Both Schweinbacher and Larralde (2012) and Pope (2011) see crowdfunding as 
particularly valuable to new businesses that often have difficulty raising venture capital. 
It may be especially helpful for small businesses because it allows them to reach wider 
audiences of potential investors than they otherwise would be able to. Schweinbacher and 
Larralde (2012) write that traditional fundraising methods like loans, venture capital 
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investment, and angel investments are often difficult for new organizations to use. In 
contrast, crowdfunding can be a viable fundraising method for small organizations or 
projects where these other avenues for capital are unavailable. Similarly, Pope (2011) 
argues that crowdfunding might be especially valuable to very small companies with only 
a few employees that need relatively small amounts of capital.  
MODELS OF CROWDFUNDING 
 While the definitions and examples of crowdfunding presented thus far convey 
the broad scope of practices which it encompasses, Bradford (2012) distinguishes five 
distinct models of crowdfunding: donation, reward, pre-purchase, lending, and equity. 
The driving force behind these distinctions is to model ways in which the different forms 
of crowdfunding interact with the law. In reviewing these categories, we do not perceive 
an important legal distinction between the pre-purchase model and the reward model. 
Consequently, our own organization and discussion of crowdfunding models below 
simply mentions pre-purchase as one example of the reward model.  
1. The Donation model 
In this category of crowdfunding, donors give money without receiving or 
expecting to receive any material item in return. Previously mentioned GlobalGiving 
exemplifies this crowdfunding model. Barack Obama’s use of crowdfunding in his 2008 
Presidential campaign would also fall in this category (albeit one might argue it useful to 
distinguish potentially self-benefitting versus purely altruistic forms of donation-based 
crowdfunding). Obama’s campaign successfully organized millions of supporters online, 
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raising $750 million from 2 million donors in just 21 months, with 80% of the donations 
being less than $200 (Bradley, 2008; Brewer, 2011).  
2. The Reward model  
This model also seeks donations from the crowd without monetary compensation. 
However, the reward model offers other extrinsic incentives in the form of rewards to 
encourage people to donate. Often these rewards are materials goods, but they can be 
almost anything: from specialized thank you letters, to artwork stickers, etc. Here, 
Bradford distinguishes between the reward model and what he calls the prepurchase 
model. In the prepurchase model, artists give copies of the work they are seeking funding 
for. So, a musician might give a copy of her new albums to encourage donations. This, 
however, seems to be a specialized form of the reward model, rather than a distinct model 
itself. In the prepurchase model, the reward is the artwork instead of something else. So, 
it seems logical to consider them as one category instead of two.    
Many platforms use the reward model. Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com), for 
example, was founded in 2009 by Yancey Strickler and Perry Chen as a forum where 
users can post project ideas and seek support from the crowd (Martiniere, 2011; 
Schonfeld, 2011). Importantly, while it encourages users to offer incentives to their 
donors, it prohibits them from offering equity investments in their projects. Indiegogo 
(www.indiegogo.com), which bills itself as “the world’s largest global funding platform,” 
is another example of this model. Once again, it provides a space for people with project 
ideas to connect with donors, allowing users to offer different rewards to incentivize 
support. A third example of this model is RocketHub (www.rockethub.com). RocketHub 
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gives crowdfunders a community and infrastructure wherein they can seek “fuel” 
(funding) for their projects, and “fuelers” can “receive cool stuff” in exchange.  
3. The Lending model 
In this model, funders do not merely donate money. Instead they give loans with 
the expectation of repayment. Previously mentioned Kiva exemplifies this model, as does 
Deki (www.deki.co.uk), another platform to provide microloans for charitable causes. 
Deki is a UK not-for-profit organization whose mission is to help borrowers start small 
businesses and create a way out of poverty (dailycrowdsource.com). Meanwhile, Prosper 
(www.prosper.com) and Lending Club (www.lendingclub.com) offer a variation on the 
lending model that differs a bit from Kiva or Deki. Instead of focusing on charitable 
causes, Prosper and Lending Club allows users to loan money to people and business and 
earn interest from their loans.  
4. The Equity Investment model (crowdfinance).  
Crowdfinancers offer a percentage ownership of their project/company to people 
for investing. In doing so, they give people the chance to profit from the success of the 
ventures that they buy into. Unfortunately for potential crowdfinancers, however, deals 
like this might run into problems with federal securities laws. So, today there are not 
many platforms that allow crowdfinance. Nevertheless, at least one U.S. company, 
ProFounder (www.profoudner.com), claims to provide a way to use crowdfunding to 
offer equity investments. It does so by giving users information about the limited 
exceptions to securities laws, and providing them with tools to take advantage of them. 
Significantly, it does not provide a platform where users can advertise deals or collect 
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investments and it does not facilitate relationships with investors. Instead, it helps users 
find investors within their own communities, and gives crowdfunders the legal ability to 
offer equity to them.  
THE CASE OF BUYABEERCOMPANY.COM 
While Crowdfunding offers potential to successfully raise funds while building 
interest and support in a product/company, it can violate federal securities laws in some 
circumstances.  
In 2009, the Kalmanovitz Charitable Foundation, owners of the Pabst Brewing 
Company, decided to sell the beer company for $300 million dollars. Hearing about the 
offer, Michael Migliozzi and Brian Flatow decided to try to buy it. Not having the money 
themselves, however, they decided to ask the crowd for help (Allen, 2010). Instead of a 
sophisticated fundraising plan, Migliozzi and Flatow simply set up a website – 
BuyaBeerCompany.com – and offered a deal to anyone who wanted to join in: give 
money and get a piece of Pabst. Initially, they did not collect actual donations; rather, 
they gathered pledges that they would collect once they raised the requisite $300 million 
(Singer, 2011).   
Improbably, the Buyabeercompany.com fundraising campaign was tremendously 
successful. Only building interest in their company via their website, Facebook, and 
Twitter, and offering the chance to own a part of a famous beer brand, Migliozzi and 
Flatow raised $14.75 million in pledges in just three weeks, $100,000,000 by the end of 
2009, and yet another $100,000,00 by March 2010 (Crowdfunding: Connecting Investors 
and Job Creators, 2011). Around this time, however, the Securities and Exchanges (SEC) 
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commission finally caught wind of BuyaBeerCompany. The agency informed Migliozzi 
and Flatow that they were under investigation for offering unregistered securities in 
violation of the Securities Act of 1933, and started the process that would eventually end 
the business. Finally, on June 8, 2011, the SEC issued a cease and desist order to 
Migliozzi and Flatow, ending the BuyaBeerCompany experiment before it collected any 
money at all (SEC, 2011). When BuyaBeerCompany closed, it had $282 million in 
pledges from 7 million people at an average of just $38 per pledge. (Migliozzi, 2011).  
We can learn at least two lessons from this example. First, crowdfunding has 
amazing potential. Migliozzi and Flatow simply asked for support and offered people a 
simple, fair deal in an open call for support, and the response was impressive. Second, 
this story highlights the central debate in crowdfunding today: Under current law, 
crowdfinance is either illegal, or practically impossible for the average entrepreneur. 
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
The principle legal concern in crowdfunding is whether an offer falls under 
federal securities regulation and thus can be regulated by the SEC. As with 
BuyaBeerCompany, offers of securities must be registered with the agency or they are 
illegal. Still, not all offers are securities. Moreover, some offers fall under exemptions in 
law. These exemptions, however, are unavailable to most crowdfinance ventures.  
Two federal statutes lay the groundwork for U.S. securities regulation.1 Partially 
spurred on by the large number of fraudulent securities that contributed to the stock 
market crash in 1929, the U.S. Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 to provide 
                                                   
1 While there is some state regulation of securities, we limit this discussion to federal law. 
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protection against such events in the future. This act focuses on the distribution of 
securities, requiring registration of securities that are offered to the public for the first 
time, and certain disclosures from the issuers of those securities. In 1934, Congress 
passed the Securities Exchange Act, which, among other things, established the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the agency that still oversees and regulates U.S. securities 
today (Hazen, 2009).  
To fall under the ambit of the Securities Act of 1933 and the SEC’s jurisdiction, a 
financial instrument must qualify as a “security” within the meaning of the law. 15 
U.S.C. § 77b lists several different instruments that are "securities" under this law, 
including: notes, stocks, bonds, evidence of indebtedness, and “investment contracts.” 
Unless there is an exception/exemption, securities must be registered with the SEC, and 
this agency has authority to regulate securities in several ways (Hazen, 2009). Since it is 
intended to provide investors with information to help them make safer investments, 
registration requires businesses to disclose information to the SEC about the principle 
parties making the offering, the nature of the business, and financial statements. The 
registration process is very rigorous, and it might be too difficult, time-consuming, and/or 
costly for most crowdfunders to use (Bradford, 2011).  
The question is whether a crowdfunding offer constitutes an investment contract 
and is thereby a security under federal law. In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a 
test to determine what constitutes an investment contract. The Court held that an 
investment contract is: (1) An investment of money in (2) a common enterprise with (3) 
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an expectation of profits (4) derived solely from the actions of others (SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., 1946). 
Notably, Hazen (2009) writes that the definition an investment contract “depends 
not so much on what is actually being offered but how it is being offered, and what is 
being promised” (p. 28). Investor perception is key in determining whether something is 
a security or not. Courts will often look at how an investor understood a situation to make 
this determination. If an investor buys a financial instrument from a broker, a court is 
more likely to find it to be a security than if the same instrument comes from a layperson. 
So, a nonprofessional crowdfunding offer might look less like an investment contract 
than one which passes through a third party intermediary platform. 
Even though they might be nonprofessional, however, crowdfinance projects 
clearly implicate this law. Consider again BuyaBeerCompany. Migliozzi and Flatow 
sought monetary investments in Pabst (an investment of money), from anyone who 
wanted to join in (probably a common enterprise), while offering an expectation of profit 
(a percentage company ownership), and the investors need only to give money. Though 
average crowdfunders like Migliozzi and Flatow would probably not be considered 
securities professionals, the other factors still weigh toward their offer being a security. 
Certainly the SEC thought so in this example. Importantly, almost any crowdfinance 
project would implicate this law; it is not limited to deals of a certain size or investor 
amount. 
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Exemptions to registration for certain types of investment offers 
Even though many crowd equity investment schemes seem to fall under securities 
regulation, the law has several exemptions from registration that could apply. Ultimately, 
however, these provisions will not likely offer protection for crowdfunded equity 
investments.  
Federal securities law permits certain private and/or relatively small offerings of 
securities by exempting them from registration. First, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), allows some 
private offerings without registration if the purchasers of the securities are able to 
evaluate the risks of the investment, have access to the kind of information that would 
ordinarily be available to the SEC, and agree not to resell the security. Rule 504 (17 
C.F.R. § 230.504) permits a company to offer up to $1,000,000 in securities during any 
12-month period without any disclosure requirements or limitation on the number of 
purchasers (SEC Rule 504, 2009). Rule 505 (17 C.F.R. § 230.505) raises this number to 
$5 Million, but increases the limitations on the issuer and the offering. It permits 
unlimited “accredited investors” – primarily banks, business, and high income investors – 
but only thirty-five non-accredited (SEC Rule 505, 2009). Finally, Rule 506 (17 C.F.R. § 
230.506) creates a “safe harbor” for certain private offerings if the offering company only 
sells to an unlimited number of purchasers and up to thirty-five “sophisticated 
purchasers” – people who have sufficient knowledge and experience in finance and 
business such that they can evaluate the risks of their investment (SEC Rule 506, 2009).  
 Still, these exemptions will not be available to most crowdfinance ventures. As 
aforementioned, the exemptions are designed to give certain private offerings a way to 
 47 
avoid registration. Any offer that involves a general solicitation violates these rules. 
Crowdfunding relies on the open call for investors; it is inherently non-private. 
Accordingly, the nature of crowdfunding seems fatal to using these exemptions in 
crowdfinance situations.  
Nevertheless, ProFounder claims to enable people to use crowdfinance within the 
limits of Rules 504 and 506. However, it seems questionable whether ProFounder is, in 
fact, a true form of crowdfunding. As discussed, it does not actually provide a platform 
where people may advertise or sell their securities. Moreover, it does not facilitate 
connections between offerers and potential investors. Instead, ProFouder only helps 
people build their business and raise capital within the limits of the law, and not in the 
form of an open call for investment. While this might be a valuable service, it is 
questionable if it is truly crowdfunding. 
THE FUTURE OF CROWDFUNDING  
Crowdfunding’s popularity has skyrocketed in the past few years. Kickstarter, for 
instance, has been tremendously successful, raising nearly $100,000,000 for 27,000 
projects during 2011 alone (G.F., 2012). In February 2012, it had its first project to raise 
$1,000,000 in one day (Strickler, 2012). Kiva, meanwhile, has loaned nearly 
$300,000,000 from 1 million users since 2005 (Kiva, 2012). Because of success stories 
like these, the federal government has begun to explore ways make crowdfinance 
available to small businesses.  
Currently, there are three crowdfinance bills active in Congress. One bill has 
already passed the House, and the Senate is considering two other versions of a law that 
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would open the door to many crowdfunding ventures that want to use the equity model. 
Any law that eventually passes will not provide carte blanche authority to raise money. It 
will, however, likely give significant ability for small businesses to use crowdfinance in 
ways that the current exemptions to not allow. Yet it will likely do so at the expense of 
the third party intermediary platforms that facilitate these deals.  
On September 14, 2011, Rep. Patrick McHenry (R-NC), introduced into the 
House of Representatives the Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act (H.R. 2930). H.R. 2930 
would dramatically change the law with regard to crowdfinance, and enable relatively 
small businesses to use this model to amass capital for their projects (Burke, 2012). In 
general, it would deregulate certain smaller investments, taking them from the SEC’s 
purview. It does this by amending 15 U.S.C. § 77d to allow businesses that raise less than 
$1,000,000 per year to sell equity investment without registering with the SEC. Business 
would be able to raise up to $2,000,000 per year if they provide their investors with 
audited financial statements. Individual investors could only invest up to the lesser of 
$10,000 or 10% of their annual income per year.  
After the limitations on business size, H.R. 2930 contains a list of requirements 
for either crowdfunding intermediary websites or on crowdfunders themselves. Though 
the law may remove investments that fall under this exception from direct review by the 
SEC, it offers some protection to investors by providing them with information and 
safeguards that are somewhat similar to registration requirements for non-exempt 
securities. So the act places burdens on the “third party intermediaries” that make these 
investments possible and/or onto the sellers themselves. These requirements are: 
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(1) Third party intermediary sites must warn investors that investing in 
inherently speculative and that investors can only spend a maximum of 
10,000/10% of their annual income.  
(2) They must warn investors that there are restrictions on resale of the 
securities. (3) They must try to reduce the risk of fraud in these offerings.  
(4) They must give information about themselves (address, website, names 
employees) to the SEC.  
(5) They must give the SEC the same access to the site that they give their 
investors.  
(6) They must require investors to answer questions that show whether 
they understand the risks of investing.  
(7) They must require issuers to set a fundraising goal and deadline. 
Further, they must withhold they money raised until it reaches at least 
60% of that goal.  
(8) They must carry out background checks on the issuers.  
(9) They must give the SEC notice of the offering when it begins, 
including information about the offerer’s name, address, website, purpose, 
and the target offering amount.  
(10) They must outsource their cash management to qualified third party 
custodians.  
(11) They must maintain their records according to the SEC’s 
requirements. (12) They must enable issuers and investor to be able to 
communicate with each other through their websites.  
(13) They must notify the SEC when the offering is complete.  
(14) They cannot over investment advice.  
 
This list creates something similar to the registration process that is required for 
public offerings. These new rules would provide potential investors with information 
about companies and about investing in general so that they could better investment 
choices. Moreover, they would create an additional layer of protection that an 
intermediary might not provide on its own, including things like instituting cash 
management protections, conducting background checks on issuers, and enabling 
communication between issuers and investors.  
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If the issuer decides to forgo using a third party intermediary, the bill would shift 
the burden to the issuer to provide the same investor information/caution that the 
intermediary would have to provide, with one addition: the issuer would have to disclose 
on their website that they have a financial interest in this deal. Thus, they would have to 
clearly state that they are issuing this deal with the intent of profiting from it so investors 
do not mistakenly think that it is a charitable cause.  
A noteworthy provision of H.R. 2930 is that it would specifically preempts state 
law. Under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution (art VI, Cl. 2), federal laws 
take precedence where they conflict with state laws, provided it falls under the powers 
granted to the federal government by the Constitution. When federal laws specifically 
withdraw state regulation over a particular are of the law, this is called “express 
preemption.” (Maggs & Smith, 2011). By its text, H.R. 2930 would remove almost any 
state regulation of offerings that qualify under this new exemption. It would allow states 
to provide protection against and/or unlawful conduct, but they cannot directly regulate 
crowdfunded securities. Finally, the law would restrict investors from transferring the 
securities they purchase for the first year, except to sell them back to the issuer or to an 
accredited investor.  
While H.R. 2930 has already passed the House, the U.S. Senate is debating two 
other crowdfunding exemptions of their own that are similar to, but distinct from the 
House bill. On Nov. 2, 2011, Senator Scott Brown (R-MA) introduced Senate bill 1791, 
Democratizing Access to Capital Act (S.1791). Then, on December 8, 2011, Senators Jeff 
Merkley (D-OR) and Michael Bennet (D-CO) proposed Senate bill 1970, the “Capital 
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Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure” (or 
CROWDFUND) Act (S.1970).  
Both Senate bills would create more consumer protections than the House bill. 
First, the Democratizing Access to Capital Act would limit the amount of money that can 
a crowdfunder can raise per annum to $1,000,000, but would not permit this to increase. 
Moreover, it would restrict the amount that a single investor can invest to $1000 per year. 
The CROWDFUND Act would reduce the amount investors may invest in crowdfunding 
ventures even further. Once again, companies would only be able to raise up to 
$1,000,000 per year. However, S. 1970 would limit the individual investment amount 
across all crowdfunding ventures in one year to the greater of $500, 1% of the investor’s 
income if he/she makes between $50,000 and $100,000, or 2% of their annual income if 
they earn over $200,000.  
Both S.1791 and S.1970 put more emphasis on third part intermediaries than H.R. 
2930. Neither bill would permit crowdfunders to offer equity investments by themselves. 
Instead, all crowdfinance ventures would have to pass through an established platform. 
Furthermore, both bills would put more burdens on the third parties than H.R. 2930. The 
Democratizing Access to Capital Act is similar to H.R. 2930 in this respect, but has 
notable differences. S.1970, on the other hand, differs more significantly from H.R. 2930 
in attempting to offer greater protection for consumers. By juxtaposing the three acts, we 
can immediately see the differences, and potential points of conflict between the houses 




H.R. 2930 S.1791 S.1970 
Warn investors of the 
speculative nature of these 
investments 
   
Warn consumers that there 
are restrictions on resale of the 
securities 
   
Try to reduce the risk of fraud  
   
Provide the SEC with 
information about the 
intermediary (address, 
website, employees) 
   
Give the SEC investor-level 
access 
   
Require investors to answer 
questions about the risks 
involved with investing 
  * 
Require issuers to set a 
monetary goal and deadline 
and must withhold the 
investments until they raise at 
least 60% of that goal 
  * 
Carry out background checks 
on the issuers’ principles 
  * 
Give the SEC notice of the 
offering including information 
about the issuer (name, 
address, principles, purpose) 
 *  
Outsource their cash 
management 
   
Maintain their records 
according to the SEC’s 
requirements 
   
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Provide a way for issuers and 
investors to communicate  
   
Notify the SEC when the 
offering is compete 
  
 
They cannot offer investment 
advice 
   





Provide a way for investors 





Prohibit employees from 
investing in offers made 
through the intermediary or 




Create a method for investors 




Provide disclosures such as 




Provide information about the 




Allow investors to cancel their 
commitments to invest 
  
 
Try to ensure that investors do 
not exceed investment limits 
  
 
Protect the privacy of 




Not compensate people to 





(*the provision is in the bill, but its language differs significantly from 
at least one of the other bills. Any difference in language needs to be 
reconciled.) 
 
Meanwhile, setting the other important provisions of these two bills reveals 
several other differences.  
Provision H.R. 2930 S. 1791 S.1970 
Third party 
intermediary required 








$10,000 or 10% annual 
income 
$1,000 $500, %1 of income between 
$50,000 and $100,000, 2% 
income greater than $100,000 
Third party 
intermediary must 
register with the SEC 
and/or any applicable 
self-regulatory 
organizations 
No No Yes 
Creates a cause of 
action for investors 
No No  Yes 




States can bring action against 
fraud; Permits state 
registration if 50% or more of 
funds come from that state 
 
S.1970 is clearly the strictest of any of the bills. It would significantly limit the 
amount any investor may invest in crowdfinance per year, and create many additional 
requirements for intermediaries beyond H.R. 2930 and S. 1970. Concurrently, even with 
its long list of requirements, H.R. 2930 it is still the most open of the three bills. It would 
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allow greater investment by investors, higher max-business size for offerers, and does not 
require third party intermediaries. Furthermore, it would preempt state regulation, thereby 
removing any additional protection from the states. S.1791, in some ways is a middle 
ground between the two. It would increase the protections offered to investors by 
lowering max investment limits, mandating that offers pass through intermediaries, and 
requiring that intermediaries build in things like complaint mechanisms and 
communications channels. It would also leave states with some ability to regulate these 
securities. Still, it is more similar to H.R. 2930 than it is to the CROWDFUND act.  
At this point, S.1970 seems to have received the most attention in the Senate. In 
December, 2011, the Committee heard testimony from two experts, both of whom 
supported the CROWDFUND Act over S.1791. Harvard Law School Professor John C. 
Coastes IV noted that any law that Congress considered must delicately balance a trade-
off between economic growth and investor protection. Anything that does not provide 
significant investor protection invites “catchy, high-risk, and very possibly fraudulent 
investment scheme[s]” (Examining investor risks in capital raising, Coastes, 2011, p. 10). 
For this reason, he was concerned about S.1791 and argued for S.1970, which offers 
more protections for consumers. Similarly, Mr. Mark Hiraide, a securities lawyer, partner 
at the law firm Petillon, Hiraide, Loomis, and former SEC attorney, agreed with Prof. 
Coates on the relative merits of the two bills. He argued that S.1970 is a better balance of 
the interests of facilitating access to capital while still providing investor protection. 
(Examining investor risks in capital raising, Hiraide, 2011).   
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With the support for greater investor protection, it seems likely that any potential 
law that the Senate passes will create significant requirements for third party 
intermediaries. Considering the areas where all three bills coincide, the requirements they 
would place on intermediaries range from basic to fairly sophisticated. For example, it 
should be relatively simple for a website to require potential investors to answer 
questions about risks and safe investing. Conducting background checks, however, 
requires a higher degree of work and sophistication. Indeed, even if an established 
platform like Kickstarter wanted to start offering crowdfinance, which already has a 
strong infrastructure and could conceivably move into this field quickly and effectively, it 
might not be prepared to be an intermediary under these bills. 
Currently, debate has stalled in the Senate. However, on March 8, 2012, the 
House of Representatives passed H.R. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS” 
Act), H.R. 3606 (Wolters Kluwer, 2012). As part of this legislation, the House included 
the already-passed H.R. 2930, sending it to the Senate once again, and urging action. 
With this renewed legislative interest, it likely that some crowdfunding exemption will 
soon become law.  
CONCLUSION 
The world of crowdfunding is rapidly developing, but still in flux. On one hand, 
examples like Kiva and Kickstarter show how effective this form of fundraising is, and 
will certainly continue to be in the future. On the other, crowdfinance is still largely 
illegal, and without action from the government, will stay that way. Nevertheless, it 
seems likely that the federal government will develop some exception for crowdfinance 
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soon. While the future is still bit unclear, perhaps next year we will all have a chance to 
buy a beer company together as a crowd of funders.  
ADDENDUM  
On April 5, 2012, after the writing of this chapter, the U.S. government enacted 
the JOBS Act, now Public Law Number 112-106. While the basis for the law was H.R. 
2930, the law as passed included an amendment from the Senate, which made some 
important changes (Schuster, 2012). As predicted, the final law is a bit of a compromise 
between the House and the Senate – it is not quite as restrictive as the Senate bills and not 
as permissive as the House Bill.  
As the law now stands, it allows people to raise up to $1,000,000 through 
crowdfunding. However, they cannot do so without using a licensed broker or a third 
party intermediary “funding portal” to make their investment offers. These funding 
portals must register with the SEC and provide users with things like information about 
the risks of investing and about the terms of specific offers. Furthermore, they must 
perform background checks on the issuers and try to ensure that investors are not 
investing more than maximum investment amounts established in the statute (Hanigan 
and Wickham, 2012). 
Hanigan and Wickham (2012) write that the new law requires small businesses 
that want to use this exemption must give investors/potential investors and their 
brokers/funding portals or the SEC with certain financial statement. Moreover, the law 
requires these small business to provide some degree of credibility behind the validity of 
these statements. For offerings that are less than $100,000, the CEO of the business must 
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personally attest to the accuracy of their financial statements.  For offerings between 
$100,000 and $500,000, businesses must hire accountants to review their statements. For 
offerings that are greater than $500,000, they must submit fully audited statements to the 
SEC. Finally, Hanigan and Wickham note that once an offering has succeeded, these 
companies must annually file statements with the SEC. Accordingly, the law allows 
crowdfinance deals to go forward, but places important safeguards for investors, and 
regulations on both third party intermediaries and the small businesses that want to use 
this new exemption.  
Currently, even though the JOBS act is now law, the crowdfunding is still 
unavailable. The SEC notes that the law requires the agency to adopt rules that will 
implement the new laws. Until they do so, the crowdfunding exemption is not available 
to anyone. However, after the 270 day rule making window runs out (Schuster, 2012), 





Online Private Agreements and Crowdsourcing 
Contracts are critical to the efficient functioning of the online world even more 
than offline. Private agreements between individuals define and regulate our behavior 
online more than laws (Ballon, 2010). Indeed, these agreements are essential to the 
efficient and legal operation of any online service, including crowdsourcing service 
providers like Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.Mturk.com), Kickstarter 
(www.Kickstarter.com), and Crowdspring (www.crowdspring.com). Using what are 
called click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements, private agreements regulate user activity, 
attempt to insulate and/or control potential litigation, and help to define the boundaries 
between correct and incorrect behavior on the service. Despite their importance and near 
ubiquity, however, consumers generally do not read these agreements (Hillman & 
Barakat, 2008-2009). In this chapter, we examine how crowdsourcing platforms use these 
online agreements to bind their users to certain terms and conditions. We start by 
providing a primer on basic contract law and contract formation. We then assess the 
validity of standardized online form contracts formed through click-wrap or browse-wrap 
agreements. Next, we look at online agreements in the open source industry and a recent 
case that officially upheld their enforceability. Following that, we consider several 
provisions that are common to standardized form agreements – both online and off. 
Finally, we conduct a content analysis of the Terms of Use agreements (TOUs) from 
several different crowdsourcing platforms and services to better understand how the legal 
landscape around crowdsourcing is taking shape.  
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A BRIEF PRIMER ON CONTRACT LAW 
 At their most basic, contracts are promises made between two parties to take some 
action. Obviously, however, many promises are not, in fact, contracts; it would be 
impossible for courts to give the power of law to every casual agreement. Instead, the law 
chooses to enforce certain bargained-for exchanges between parties because they have 
certain features that make them “contracts” under the law (Ferriell, 2009).  
To be enforceable, all contracts must have at least three parts. (Rohwer and 
Skrocki, 2010). First all contracts must have an offer made by an offerer. The offer 
creates the power of acceptance in the offeree, defines the proper method(s) for 
acceptance, and opens the door for a contract to form. Second, there must be acceptance 
of the terms from the offerer by an offeree. Significantly, acceptance does not need to be 
expressed verbally or in writing. Rather, it can be inferred by how the parties conduct 
themselves after supposed contract formation. If, for example, an offeree begins using an 
offeror’s product, a court might assume that the offeree has accepted the terms of the 
usage agreement. Third, all contracts must have “consideration.” Consideration is that 
which induces the parties to exchange promises to conduct certain duties; it is the 
“bargained-for exchange” between the parties to the contract (American Law Institute, 
1981). Ferriell (2009) describes consideration as a quid pro quo: each side to the contract 
gives and gets what they want out of the arrangement.   
 Even though the ideal of a bargained-for exchange might be an arms-length deal 
where both parties have equal opportunity and ability to negotiate contract terms, this 
situation is not necessary for valid contracts to exist. In fact, non-negotiated, standardized 
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form contracts made between parties at a distance from each other are quite common. 
Indeed, they make up most of the consumer contracts in the country (Goodman, 1999). 
Often called “contracts of adhesion” in a pejorative sense, these agreements are 
standardized take-it-or-leave-it agreements where consumers cannot obtain products or 
services without agreeing to the terms of the contract. There is no opportunity or ability 
to negotiate; one party defines all the terms and demands acceptance to them (Ferriel, 
2010).  
One of the most commonly used examples in the scholarship of these form 
contracts are insurance policies (Ferriell, 2010). Insurers offer potential policy holders 
deals, and the only way consumers can obtain a policy is to agree to the terms as written; 
there is no chance for discussion of the terms. Williston (2011) notes that that adhesion 
contracts in insurance policies are not automatically void. However, if there is any 
ambiguity in the terms, the court will usually interpret the unclear provisions against the 
drafter.  
Even though insurance contracts might be a common example of contracts of 
adhesion, today online agreements are perhaps even more prevalent. Indeed any time we 
go online, we encounter these types of agreement whether we realize it or not. Even 
anecdotal experience reveals how common they are; whenever you click “I Agree” or 
something similar online, you are engaging in a contract, and potentially binding yourself 
to whatever terms are therein (Conklin, 2008). Indeed, sometimes you do not even need 
to click anything; the mere use of a site might make you party to a Terms of Use 
agreement.  
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While they might seem strange at first, non-negotiated, standard form contracts 
are most often enforceable. Ferriel (2010) writes that much of modern life would be 
impossible if adhesion contracts were unenforceable and all terms required independent 
negotiation. Standardized forms simplify the contracting process and reduce the 
transaction costs of entering into the many contracts we do almost daily. Accordingly, 
they are vital to the efficient operation of daily life, and affect nearly everyone who goes 
online.  
A CONTRACT IN CYBER SPACE IS STILL A CONTRACT 
As discussed, we interact with standardized contracts everywhere and nearly 
every day. Anytime you click “I Agree” to the Terms of Use of a website, or even 
possibly every time you use a web service, you are agreeing to online standardized form 
contracts. While these agreements may pass commonly without challenge, there is some 
room for debate over their validity.  
Even though they occur online, and the parties are clearly distant from each other, 
all contracts must still satisfy the basic requirements of offer, acceptance, and 
consideration (Conklin, 2008). In general, online agreements fall into two categories: 
click-wrap (also known as click-through) agreements and browse-wrap agreements. The 
major difference between them is the method of acceptance defined by the offerer.  
Click-wrap agreements are agreements that are presented to users of a web 
platform before they can use the services that the site offers. They require users to 
affirmatively manifest assent to the terms and conditions of the website. As a prototypical 
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example, a site might require a user to register, and click a check box that says “I agree to 
the terms and conditions of this website” before being given access.  
Browse-wrap agreements, on the other hand, do not explicitly require 
manifestation of assent to a website’s terms before using its services. Instead, using the 
site itself constitutes assent. Moreover, the Terms of Use are located on another page and 
users are not specifically directed to them (Rambarran and Hunt, 2007). On Yahoo, for 
example, a user can access the site whether she creates an account or not; Yahoo holds 
users to their terms either way: “By accessing and using the Yahoo! Services, you accept 
and agree to be bound by the terms and provision of the TOS” (Yahoo.com). 
Accordingly, it does not matter if you specifically agree to these terms. Yahoo believes 
that simply by using its service, you are bound under its terms of use contract.  
The legal analysis of the validity of both click-wrap and browser warp agreements 
starts with ProCD v. Zeidenberg (86 F.3d 1447). In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered whether Matthew Zeidenberg was bound to the terms of a “shrink -
wrap license” that was contained with a piece of software he purchased. Shrink-wrap 
licenses, also known as End User License Agreements (EULAs), are agreements that are 
inside software packaging and become active as soon as the end user breaks the 
cellophane around the box. Hence the name, “shrink-wrap license.”  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in ProCD held that such agreements are 
enforceable as long as they are valid according to general principles of contract law 
(Goodman, 1999). The district court originally held that the license was ineffective and 
Zeidenberg was not bound to its terms because they did not appear on the package. The 
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Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed with Zeidenberg and the district court. Judge 
Easterbrook wrote that such transactions, where money is exchanged before the detailed 
terms of the agreement are communicated between the parties, are extremely common in 
today’s commercial world. Furthermore, an offerer may invite acceptance to the 
agreement as he sees fit. Here, ProCD’s offer could be accepted by using the software. 
Accordingly, there was a valid agreement and Zeidenberg was bound by it.  
CLICK-WRAP AND BROWSE-WRAP AGREEMENTS SINCE PROCD 
 Since ProCD, shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and browse-wrap agreements have 
become increasingly common. While the Seventh Circuit (and many subsequent courts) 
have upheld the validity of EULAs, click-wrap and browse-wrap differ in ways that could 
significant affect their validity.  
 After ProCD, courts have generally upheld click-wrap agreements as valid 
contracts. Nathan Davis (2007) writes that the first time a click-wrap agreement was 
tested in court was in 1998 in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie (47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1020). 
In this case, Van$ Money Pie used Hotmail accounts to send thousands of spam email 
messages. Hotmail’s Terms of Service included a prohibition against sending unsolicited 
bulk email messages. The court issued an injunction against Van$, stopping this 
prohibited behavior because it believed that Hotmail was likely to succeed on the merits 
of a breach of contract dispute. While the case did not proceed from here, it nevertheless 
shows that the court believed that a valid contract existed between Hotmail and Van$.   
 Since this case, Davis (2007) writes that courts have taken a fairly “straight 
forward approach” to analyzing click-wrap agreements (p. 582). These agreements must 
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satisfy the offer, acceptance, and consideration requirements like any contract. Offer and 
consideration are clear here: the terms themselves are the offer; the quid pro quo 
exchange is that the platform gets the user’s acceptance to the terms and the user gets to 
use the product. As for acceptance of the offer, Davis (2007) writes that courts generally 
hold an action such as clicking “I Agree” generally constitutes such. Courts have only 
found lack of assent in three circumstances: where the user was not clearly required to 
show assent before the transaction; where the user was never required to show assent; and 
where the user’s action arose before she showed assent.   
Meanwhile, though click-wrap agreements have been almost uniformly upheld, 
browse-wrap agreements have received more scrutiny. Rambaraan and Hunt (2007) write 
that one concern of browse-wrap agreements is that they do not have the same guaranteed 
notice to potential offerees as click-wrap agreements. In Specht v. Netscape 
Communications Corp (2002), for example, now-Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor 
writing at that time as a judge on the Second Circuit, struck down a browse-wrap 
agreement for this reason. In this case, the plaintiffs downloaded Netscape’s web 
browser, Communicator, using a service called “SmartDownload.” When they did this, 
there was no click-wrap agreement to accept. Instead, there was a list of license terms 
that was only visible if the plaintiffs scrolled down to the next screen. Because the terms 
were not presented to the offerees, the court found that there was no clear manifestation 
of assent, and thus no agreement. 
Kunz, Ottaviani, Zif, Moringiello, Porter, and Debrow (2003) write that, given the 
cases including and following Specht, a user likely assents to a browse-wrap agreement 
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and will likely be held to its terms if four elements are satisfied. First, the user must be 
given adequate notice. The existence of an agreement cannot be hidden from the user. 
Second, the user must have the opportunity to review the agreements terms. Third, the 
user is given notice that certain actions will show assent to the terms of the agreement. 
Finally, the user takes that action. While some courts have upheld agreements that do not 
satisfy all of these terms, Kunz et al. write that browse-wrap agreements which do 
contain these can be relied upon as valid. 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Though click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements may be valid ways of contract 
formation, a court can refuse to enforce a contract or any portion of a contract if it finds 
that the contract or clause is “unconscionable.” The unconscionability doctrine is based 
on the court’s equitable powers that permit it to reject agreements that are grossly unfair 
to one party. Importantly, Korobkin (2003) writes that this is the primary method that 
courts use to reject terms in form contracts, like click-wrap or browse-wrap agreements. 
Still, even though many online contracts might seem unfair, it is difficult for parties to 
successfully argue unconscionability to invalidate any contract, including the online 
variety.  
Unconscionability of contracts has a long history in our common law. Ponte 
(2011) writes this doctrine has its roots as far back as Roman times. Though courts' 
powers to uphold good faith and fair dealing in contracts stems from its role in equity, 
unconscionability today is it is a question of law for courts to decide. Moreover, the 
common law principle of freedom of contract somewhat conflicts with this doctrine. 
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Accordingly, courts will only use this in instances of great unfairness and inequality 
between the parties (Williston, 2011).  
Korobkin (2003) writes that the unconscionability doctrine is the primary way 
that courts use to reject terms in form contracts like click-wrap and browse-wrap 
agreements. Indeed, in many instances, the only defense against a well drafted click-wrap 
agreement might be that the term is so unfair that the court should not hold someone to its 
terms. To limit the application of the unconscionability doctrine, however, courts look for 
two types of unconscionability before invalidating a contract or contractual provision. 
(Williston, 2011). First, the contract must be "procedurally unconscionable.” Procedural 
unconscionability refers to the creation of the contract – was it unfairly made, did the 
accepting party have notice of the agreement, were the terms hidden (like with validity in 
general), etc. It must also be “substantively unconscionable.” This refers to the terms of 
the contract itself. Courts will look to see whether the effects of the contract are so unfair 
to one side of the agreement that it should not be enforced.  
Looking at online form contracts, one common feature to all online agreements 
that weighs toward unconscionability is that they are all necessarily contracts of 
adhesion. The parties do not negotiate the contract terms, and indeed they probably never 
speak to each other directly. Moreover, the Restatement (second) on Contracts (1981) 
states that relevant factors to consider in an unconscionability analysis include things like 
the relative power in the contracting purpose. Certainly, in most online agreements, the 
drafter of the agreement – the online service – is in a position of power over the offeree. 
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Accordingly, there are factors that weigh in favor of unconscionability in any online 
agreement.  
Still, unconscionability probably cannot be relied upon as way to escape bad 
contracts. In Wold v. Dell Finical Services (2009), a federal district court in Minnesota 
looked at the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a form contract created by Dell. 
Here, the court wrote that even though it “empathize[d] with Wold’s position,” it did not 
find this provision to be unconscionable. Merely because something is a bad deal for a 
consumer, even one in a poor bargaining position, a court will not necessarily find it to be 
unconscionable. Accordingly, though the unconscionability doctrine is available, it is 
probably not a reliable way out of online agreements. 
CONTRACTS AND THE OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT 
Beyond drawing legal boundaries and proscriptions, private contracts have the 
ability to define the environment in which an industry operates. For example, private 
agreements have been particularly important for the open source movement. Indeed, 
without well-crafted agreements, open source might never have developed as well as it 
did. Crowdsourcing draws both its name and some basic characteristics from open 
source. Jeff Howe (2006), who coined the term “crowdsourcing,” writes that it is “the 
application of Open Source principles [i.e. divided tasks and distributed labor] to fields 
outside of software.” Because of this connection, it is useful to look at the role that 
contracts have played in the open source.  
In The Wealth of Networks, Yochai Benkler (2006) writes that contracting online 
has been essential to the existence and growth of the open source movement. Like 
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crowdsourcing, open source depends on many people collaborating on a common goal. In 
something like software development, a situation with multiple creators contributing to a 
work could lead to problems with copyright law. Copyright however, which gives the 
power to control and prevent use, can conflict the ideals Richard Stallman had in mind 
when he developed the GNU operating system. Stallman envisioned a world where 
people could freely use information and software could be edited as necessary. Copyright 
often prevents with free sharing. So, Stallman created the GNU General Public License 
(GPL) to avoid some of the problems that stem copyright restrictions. 
Kumar (2006) writes that Stallman’s idea was to use copyright to protect people’s 
right to use software instead of defending creators’ monopolies over their creation. The 
GPL allows anyone to run software that falls under it, to make changes to that software, 
and requires any new software to remain under the same license. So, it binds people by 
contract to obey certain usage rights and restrictions that ensure the free distribution of 
the software.  
The GNU GPL is only one of many open source licenses in operation today. 
Gomulkiewicz (2009) notes that the Open Source Initiative has certified over sixty 
licenses. Even with all these license agreements in operation, however, there has been 
some debate over their validity. Two questions have arisen regarding the enforceability of 
open source licenses: first, is there a legally enforceable agreement with offer, 
acceptance, and consideration; second, will courts enforce the terms of these licenses 
with injunctive relief (Gomulkiewicz, 2011).  
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Recently, the Federal Circuit validated the effectiveness of the open source 
licenses in Jacobsen v. Katzer. In this case, Robert Jacobsen ran an open source software 
group that designed programs for model railroads called the Java Model Railroad 
Interface (JMRI). The JMRI designed an application called DecoderPro that allows 
people to use their computers to program the chips that control their model trains. It was 
free to download and use, but included a file which included the JMRI “Artistic License.” 
Katzer, meanwhile, offered a similar, competing piece of software called Decoder 
Commander. In developing Decoder Commander, one of Katzer’s employees 
downloaded and used DecoderPro in it. He did not, however, did not abide by the terms 
of the “Artistic License” by failing to include: the authors’ names, JMRI copyright 
notices, reference to a particular file, an identification of the original source of the 
definition files, and a description of the changes to the original code. Because Katzer did 
not follow the agreement, Jacobsen filed suit to stop Decoder Commander. 
The court held that there was a valid agreement here and that Katzer was held to 
the terms of the Artistic License. In part, the court looked at the issue of consideration. 
Ultimately, it found that it was sufficient  in this case. Consideration does not need to 
involve an exchange of money; there are numerous benefits for software users that are 
not merely economic. Accordingly, Katzer was bound by the terms of the agreement.  
The open source movement and Jacbosen v. Katzer show how legal channels can 
be used to protect rights and draw boundaries between proper and improper usage. 
Moreover, they suggest that these terms can be used for more than just drawing legal 
proscriptions. Richard Stallman did not create his GPL simply to protect his software; he 
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did it to protect the freedom of exchange of ideas. In this, the open source movement 
reveals how powerful private agreements can be.  
COMMON ONLINE AGREEMENT PROVISIONS 
 As we have seen, online agreements today are effective and, depending on a few 
factors, probably valid. Because of this, it is useful to understand their terms to know how 
they commonly regulate online behavior. In this section, we examine several boilerplate 
contract terms that appear in nearly all online standardized agreements.   
Forum Selection Clauses 
One clause that will be in almost every well-drafted online contract is a forum 
selection clause. As the name suggest, this is a provision that defines where litigants must 
bring suit for any issue stemming from the subject of the contract. Marcus (2008) writes 
that these clauses are pervasive across contracts because they give the offerer a degree of 
control over potential law suit by preventing against so-called forum shopping. When 
injured parties want to bring suit, they often try to sue in the most plaintiff-friendly 
location possible to maximize their chances for success. Forum selection clauses stop 
forum shopping by defining where a lawsuit arising from the subject of the contract may 
be filed.  
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute (1991) that a 
forum selection clause in a commercial form contract was valid. In this case, Shute, a 
cruise ship passenger, sued Carnival Cruise Lines for injuries she sustained due to a 
slippery deck mat. She filed in federal court in Washington, claiming her injuries were 
caused by negligence on the part of Carnival’s employees. Each ticket, however, had a 
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Terms and Conditions agreement that required all suits to be filed in Florida. The 
Supreme Court held that the agreement was valid and the clause was reasonable and 
enforceable. Accordingly, Shute could not bring her case in Washington.  
Following Carnival Cruise Lines, other courts have used this case to enforce 
online agreements as well. Feldman v. Google (2007), for example, found that a forum 
selection clause in a click-wrap agreement was valid. Google claimed that Feldman owed 
the company $100,000 for charges associated with his Google AdWords account. 
Feldman, however, argued that he was the victim of “click fraud” and did not owe 
Google this money. Feldman sued, seeking damages, disgorgement of any profits Google 
received from the click fraud, and restitution of any money he paid for these fake clicks.  
The dispute turned on the forum selection clause. The court held that this was 
valid. Unlike Specht, the plaintiff has clear notice that he was bound to the AdWords 
agreement. Further, the provision was both reasonable and not procedurally or 
substantively unconscionable. So, the court decided that Feldman had to be held to the 
terms of the click-wrap agreement he assented to.  
As in Feldman, forum selection clauses are likely to be enforceable unless they 
are unconscionable. Furthermore, they are in nearly all standardized form contracts, both 
online and off. Accordingly, it is useful to recognize these clauses and understand their 
purpose.  
Limitations of Liability Clauses  
Limitation on liability clauses are provisions that attempt to disclaim or prevent 
litigation on one or more potential areas of conflict. Without them, a service provider’s 
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exposure to litigation could potentially be very broad. Accordingly, these clauses are 
typical among online Terms and Use agreements (Ballon, 2010). 
Ballon (2010) writes that, while these clauses are generally enforceable unless 
they are unconscionable, some states will not enforce them where there is fraudulent 
conduct or gross negligence. Smallwood v. NCSOFT (2010), for example, refused to 
uphold a section of user agreement that attempted to avoid the plaintiff’s claims for gross 
negligence.  
Unfortunately, however, “gross negligence” is a bit difficult to define precisely. 
Stine (2011) and Proser and Keeton (1984) indicate that gross negligence is somewhere 
between ordinary negligence and recklessness. The common law holds that a person acts 
negligently if she does not use same care that a reasonable person. The standard for 
recklessness, in turn, is where someone intentionally does something, knowing that that 
this conduct creates an “unreasonable risk of physical harm to another.” (American Law 
Institute, 1979).  
While “gross negligence” remains difficult to precisely define, it is nevertheless 
clear that online agreements can limit their liability to some degree. Ballon (2010) notes 
these clauses are generally enforceable, particularly in click-through agreements where 
there is express assent. Without express or implied assent, they could be deemed invalid. 
Still, since online agreements are so frequently enforceable, and these clauses are so 
prevalent, it is useful to understand to recognize them.  
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Arbitration clauses 
Arbitration clauses are provisions that require any action arising out of the subject 
of the contract to go through arbitration instead of a lawsuit. Until recently, the validity of 
these clauses was somewhat questionable. Ballon (2010) notes that some states courts 
refused to enforce these provisions because they could prevent the plaintiff from pursuing 
class action litigation. However, after a 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision, arbitration 
clauses cannot be held invalid on these grounds.  
The Supreme Court considered an arbitration clause in the case of AT&T, LLC v. 
Conception (2011). Here, Vincent Conception sued AT&T in California Federal District 
Court for charging sales tax on “free” phones. The contract between Concepcion and 
AT&T required arbitration of all suits, but did not provide for class-wide arbitration. 
Because of this clause, AT&T moved to compel arbitration. The District Court, however, 
denied the motion because the arbitration clause disallowed class action suits. Upon 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the provision was unconscionable under 
California law. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court, however, overruled the Ninth 
Circuit. It wrote that, where state law prohibits arbitration of a claim, the Federal 
Arbitration Act supersedes this rule. Accordingly, the provision in AT&T’s contract was 
valid and enforceable. 
McCoy and Allen (2012) write that after Concepcion, federal courts have been 
more likely to enforce arbitration provisions, even when there are state laws/standards 
that might conflict with the provisions. Because of this, it has become much easier for 
defendants to compel arbitration of individual claims when class actions suits are filed. 
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Accordingly, these sorts of provisions will likely be enforceable and popular among 
online agreements.  
DMCA Safe Harbor clauses 
Any online platform that hosts links to content that could infringe copyright 
should (and usually does) have a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) notice 
provision. These provisions help to protect web services that might host or link to 
material that infringes copyright because of their users. Accordingly, any website that has 
user-generated content will likely have a DMCA notice provision, either as part of its 
Terms of Use agreement, or as a standalone section on the site.   
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to address 
several issues that were arising from the nascent internet. One action Congress took was 
to create certain “safe harbors” for websites that host infringing material from their users. 
These safe harbors allow providers of online services to avoid copyright violations where 
a user causes the infringement, if they follow certain rules.  
According to 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), to fall under the safe harbor, websites must 
establish a method whereby copyright owners can contact the website, report 
infringement, and have the content removed. The person who posted the supposedly 
infringing content then must be able to file a counter notice. If the user files counter 
notice, the webservice will replace the content unless the copyright owner decides to 
escalate the complaint to a lawsuit.  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the DMCA safe harbor 
provisions in Viacom v. Youtube (2012). In this case, Viacom sued Youtube for copyright 
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infringement on numerous works (videos) that Viacom owned. The district court granted 
YouTube’s motion for summary judgment, holding that it did everything it had to do 
under the DMCA. Viacom then appealed to the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals 
held that the District Court was correct in finding that only actual knowledge or 
awareness of infringing activity on the website could vitiate the safe harbor protections. 
However, a jury in this case could potentially find that Youtube did, in fact, have such 
knowledge. Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that summary judgment was incorrect 
and remanded the case for further hearings.  
The Youtube case notwithstanding, this safe harbor is an extremely effective way 
to avoid legal problems associated with user-generated content. Indeed, DMCA safe 
harbor clauses are almost essential for websites today. Accordingly, they are both 
extremely common and extremely important. Any website that uses any kind of user 
generated content will likely have one of these provisions. Many, but not all, 
crowdsourcing services qualify as such. Indeed, infringing material could be something 
as simple as an image used in a user profile. Thus, many crowdsourcing platforms will 
probably have a DMCA notice section to their Terms of Use agreements or as part of 
their site.  
CROWDSOURCING PLATFORM CONTRACTS SPECIFICS 
 Having reviewed several provisions that are common to all online standardize 
agreements, we now turn to look at TOU agreements from different crowdsourcing 
platforms. Here, we sampled several TOUs from platforms across the different types of 
crowdsourcing. We then assessed alongside each other to find similarities and 
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differences. We find that, though the language differs across the different services, the 
provisions are largely comparable. Wikipedia, however, with its focus on the free 
distribution of knowledge, and its connections to the roots of the open source movement, 
is notably different than many other TOUs in both content and style.  
 While the text and format of TOU agreements varies across platforms, they share 
much of the same content. Most often, TOUs start with an acceptance statement 
attempting to affirmatively bind users to the agreement. One Billion Minds, a platform 
that allows  for example, holds that “By submitting an online application for membership 
to the One Billion Minds Community, you agree to the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement and of the Service we describe” (onebillionminds.com, crowdsourced 
innovation). Interestingly, Kickstarter – the popular crowdfunding platform – claims that 
its users are parties to the agreement without registering on the site: “By using the site or 
service in any manner, including by not limited to visiting or browsing the site, you agree 
to be bound by this agreement.” (Kickstarter.com, crowdfunding). Likewise, Kiva 
(Kiva.org, crowdfunding) writes that “by accessing or using the Website [Kiva], you 
signify that you have read all of the terms and conditions in, and linked to, this 
Agreement … and you agree to be bound by this Agreement, whether or not you 
participate in Kiva’s microlending program.” These are noteworthy because, as 
aforementioned, it is questionable whether the browse-wrap construction of these 
agreements is enforceable. Nevertheless, because both services require registration before 
full usage of the site, this might not be a problem.  
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 After the assent statement, TOUs usually have the boilerplate terms discussed 
above. RocketHub – a crowdfunding platform that is somewhat akin to Kickstarter – 
holds that “any arbitration will take place in New York County, New York, United States 
of America. Any Dispute not subject to arbitration … shall be decided by a court of 
competent jurisdiction within New York County, New York, United States of America, 
and you and RocketHub agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of that court” 
(Rockethub.com, crowdfunding). Under this provision, not only must disputes be brought 
in New York, but also litigants cannot challenge the New York court’s ability to hold 
power over them. Meanwhile, the Netflix Challenge – a contest conducted by Netflix to 
improve their movie recommendation algorithm – terms agreement binds people to 
bringing disputes in San Jose, California. “By entry and participation in the Contest, 
Participants, for themselves and their schools/companies if applicable, agree that the City 
of San Jose, State of California, United States of America will be the exclusive forum for 
any formal dispute resolution.” (Netflix challenge, open innovation).  
Arbitration clauses seem to be extremely common but not universal. They are in 
agreements across types of platforms, such as: Kiva (www.kiva.org, microloans), 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com, microlabor), Crowdspring 
(www.crowdspring.com, crowdsourced creative work), the Netflix challenge (open 
innovation) and Bandcamp (www.bandcamp.com, crowdfunding). Interestingly, 
however, at least three crowdfunding platforms – Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com), 
Indiegogo (www.indiegogo.com), and RocketHub (www.rockethub.com) – and a creative 
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project – the Johnny Cash Project (www.thejohnnycashproject.com ) – do not have 
arbitration agreements. 
Turning to the DMCA safe harbor clauses, these provisions are very common, as 
predicted, but are not in all agreements. Wikipedia, for example, does something a bit 
different than most DMCA provisions. It has takedown procedures and a registered agent 
as required by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). But it does not track the language of the law, as 
many agreements do. Section 512 provides a list of requirements that a website must 
have to fall under its protections. Most often, TOUs or independent DMCA provisions 
will follow this part of the law exactly. As a prototypical example, Indiegogo holds that:  
If you believe that your copyrighted work has been copied in a way that constitutes 
copyright infringement and is accessible via the Service, please notify Indiegogo's 
copyright agent, as set forth in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"). 
For your complaint to be valid under the DMCA, you must provide the following 
information in writing:  
 
1. An electronic or physical signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the 
copyright owner;  
2. Identification of the copyrighted work that you claim has been infringed;  
3. Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing and where it is located on 
the Service;  
4. Information reasonably sufficient to permit Indiegogo to contact you, such as your 
address, telephone number, and e-mail address;  
5. A statement that you have a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or law; and  
6. A statement, made under penalty of perjury, that the above information is accurate, and 
that you are the copyright owner or are authorized to act on behalf of the owner.  
 
The above information must be submitted to the following DMCA Agent:  
 
Name: Danae Ringelmann  
… 
 
Meanwhile, sites that do not deal with user generated content do not have DMCA 
provisions. So, platforms like oDesk and Games with a Purpose (www.gwap.com) do not 
have them, and might not need them. At the same time, Amazon Mechanical Turk, which 
 80 
is somewhat similar to oDesk, includes a provision for DMCA takedown, but it is not 
part of its TOU.  
Looking more closely at these two platforms similar platforms, oDesk and 
Amazon Mechanical Turk User Agreements, both of which create online labor markets, 
have several significant differences. For example, oDesk’s agreement is about twice as 
long as Amazon’s, based on word count. In general, oDesk regulates the relationship 
between work requestors and work providers in more detail than Amazon. As a simple 
example, oDesk “expects a consistent and high level of courtesy, respect and 
professionalism from all of its Users toward each other.” Amazon does not state any 
comparable expectations. More significantly, oDesk provides a method for resolution of 
disputes that arise between workers and requestors. Amazon, in contrast, holds that it is 
not a party of any dispute between Requesters and Providers. Notably, it is not alone in 
withdrawing from user disputes. Crowdspring, Indiegogo, Kickstarter, and Kiva all have 
similar provisions, claiming to have no obligation to monitor or become involved in 
disputes. Nevertheless, even with their differences Amazon’s and oDesk’s agreements 
share many of the same provisions, both with each other and with other agreements.  
Wikipedia, on the other hand, is markedly different from the other Terms of Use 
agreements. First, it does not contain any of the boilerplate terms in the other agreements. 
Instead, Wikipedia focuses entirely on proper user behavior and on the legal regulations 
of copyrightable user generated material. Before the Terms of Use begins in proper, it 
opens with the Wikimedia (Wikipedia’s parent organization) Foundation Vision 
Statement: “Imagine a world in which every single human being can freely share in the 
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sum of all knowledge. That’s our commitment.” While this is not a binding provision, it 
nonetheless states up front Wikipedia’s expectations for its users.  
After this, Wikipedia dedicates most of the rest of its TOU to regulating its user 
generated content. Wikipedia requires material written for the site to be distributed with a 
Creative Commons Share Alike License. This license allows anyone to share or remix the 
work, but it must be attributed to its author and distributed under the same Share Alike 
license. Furthermore, all user-generated content must be distributed under the GNU Free 
Documentation license which operates similar to the Share Alike License.  
Finally, unlike every other platform, Foldit has no terms agreement at all. Foldit is 
a free game which enables users to try to solve complex protein folding puzzles. These 
game communicates the solutions to these puzzles to scientists to study their real-world 
applicability. Interestingly, a user can register for an account and download and use the 
Foldit software without agreeing to any terms and conditions at all. This is surprising, 
especially considering the near-ubiquity of agreements across all kinds of websites and 
software. Moreover, recently several gamers used Foldit to help understand how an 
AIDS-related enzyme was constructed that scientists had been unable to unravel after 
years of work (Peckham, 2011). Though the gamers might have no claim over the 
products from their work, a Terms of Use agreement might be simple and effective way 
to insulate FoldIt from potential legal problems.  
CONCLUSION 
 Even considering Foldit, the modern software and online service environment is 
almost entirely regulated by private agreement. Clickwrap and browse-wrap agreements 
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bind users to certain terms and protect service providers from some kinds of legal 
problems. While these agreements may not be as critical to the creation and development 
of the crowdsourcing industry as they have been to open source, they are nevertheless 
important to the proper operation of any web service. Furthermore, as use of 
crowdsourcing services increases, so does the likelihood of litigation. TOUs can both 
protect against legal problems and help users understand the identity of a website. 
Accordingly, online agreements will continue to be important and regulate behavior 
online; it is vital to understand what it means to click “I agree.”  
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Conclusion  
The development of the law as it applies to crowdsourcing is still in its infancy. 
At this point, there are very few statues or judicial decisions that speak directly to any 
form of crowdsourcing. In fact, a case law search for either crowdsourcing or 
crowdfunding reveals that the terms have been mentioned in only two cases. Moreover, 
neither case actually examines the legal consequences of crowdsourcing. Kickstarter v. 
ArtistShare (2012) considered whether Kickstarter’s website infringes the other 
company’s patent; a concurrence by Justice Alito in U.S. v. Jones (2012) briefly 
acknowledged the privacy concerns that GPS data from cell phones could present given 
the ability to crowdsource information from it. Ultimately, crowdsourcing is still a largely 
untouched topic by the courts.  
Yet perhaps it is because of this dearth of guiding precedent that this area needs to 
be watched and studied. This thesis addresses only a few areas where crowdsourcing and 
the law might intersect. Certainly there are many more. For this reason, anyone 
considering using crowdsourcing must be aware both of how courts might apply existing 
laws as well as what laws Congress or any state legislature might enact in the future. 
Indeed, we see presently the legal landscape of crowdsourcing beginning to change with 
the federal government is starting to consider crowdfunding as a legitimate method to 
raise money. It seems probable that more laws will come into existence in the near future. 
 Ultimately, there is room for much more work to be done to study how the law 
applies to crowdsourcing. This thesis is a first step toward a greater understanding of 
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crowdsourcing and the law. Though crowdsourcing may be developing faster than the 
law, hopefully scholarship like this can help understand how this intersection of 
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